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La réflexion est considérée comme un élément significatif de la pédagogie et de la pratique 
médicales sans qu’il n’existe de consensus sur sa définition ou sur sa modélisation. Comme la 
réflexion prend concurremment plusieurs sens, elle est difficile à opérationnaliser. Une définition 
et un modèle standard sont requis afin d’améliorer le développement d’applications pratiques de 
la réflexion. Dans ce mémoire, nous identifions, explorons et analysons thématiquement les 
conceptualisations les plus influentes de la réflexion, et développons de nouveaux modèle et 
définition. La réflexion est définie comme le processus de s’engager (le « soi » (S)) dans des 
interactions attentives, critiques, exploratoires et itératives (ACEI) avec ses pensées et ses actions 
(PA), leurs cadres conceptuels sous-jacents (CC), en visant à les changer et en examinant le 
changement lui-même (VC). Notre modèle conceptuel comprend les cinq composantes internes 
de la réflexion et les éléments extrinsèques qui l’influencent. 
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Although reflection is considered a significant component of medical education and practice, the 
literature does not provide a consensual definition or model for it. Because reflection has taken 
on multiple meanings, it remains difficult to operationalize. A standard definition and model are 
needed to improve the development of practical applications of reflection. In this master’s thesis, 
we identify, explore and thematically analyze the most influential conceptualizations of reflection, 
and develop a new theory-informed and unified definition and model of reflection. Reflection is 
defined as the process of engaging the self (S) in attentive, critical, exploratory and iterative (ACEI) 
interactions with one’s thoughts and actions (TA), and their underlying conceptual frame (CF), 
with a view to changing them and a view on the change itself (VC). Our conceptual model consists 
of the five defining core components, supplemented with the extrinsic elements that influence 
reflection. 
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The dawn of reflection 
The preponderance of reflection and developed thinking is not a recent happening. The virtues of 
reflection were already noted by the Greek philosophers. In the fourth century BC, Socrates 
remarked that “to let no day pass without […] examining both myself and others is really the very 
best thing that a man can do, and that a life without this sort of examination is not worth living.”1 
In his footsteps, the Stoics considered that the universe was fundamentally rational and that it 
could be wholly apprehended through the usage of reason. As Stoicism later flourished, one of its 
most famous disciplines, Marcus Aurelius, noted in his Meditations that although “the universe is 
change, our life is what our thoughts make of it.”2 Salience of the rational mind over the sentient 
being is one of the most significant legacy of Greco-Roman antiquity.  
It was more than a millenary later, in 1637, that René Descartes beautifully translated the 
ascendancy and elemental nature of thoughts with his Discours de la méthode’s famous “Cogito 
ergo sum.”3 Henceforth, not only was thinking essential to a worthy existence, thinking was 
deemed the proof of existence itself. Only a few decades later, reason and the triumph of reason 
would define the 18th century as the Age of Enlightenment. Carried by the works of Montesquieu, 
Voltaire, and other great philosophers of the time, rational thought would move from proving the 
existence of man to stewarding the conduct of society. Questioning the older tenets of authority, 
the new enlightened worldview gave both man and reason a more central place in all human 
endeavors. 
Whereas the origins of the process of reflection can be traced back at least to the Greek 
philosophers, the word reflection only came into usage in the 14th century. Reflection, as a word, 
saw a major increase in usage during the 18th century,4 probably fuelled more by the study of light 
than the study of thought. But it is no coincidence that the century that witnessed the rise of 
reason—and reflection—was to be called the Age of Enlightenment, and its thinkers the Lumières. 
Whereas the object of reflection in the study of optics is light, the lasting contribution of reflection 
in the study of thought has been enlightenment. Stemming from the Latin roots re- and -flectĕre, 
reflection compounds the ideas of re-, back and again, and -flectĕre, to bend.5 Analogous to 
mirrors bending light back and again to increase the brightness of space, reflections within the 
mind bend thoughts back and again to allow their greater illumination and closer scrutiny.  
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Throughout time, reflection and deep thinking has undeniably increased in importance and in 
relevance. From the individual ponderings of philosophers, it has spread to all areas of human 
study and activity. That the world of today has been deeply influenced by the forces of rationality 
and reflection is hardly disputable. 
The bittersweet (at)traction of reflection in education 
As education is always tributary to the wider societal context that it inhabits, it comes to no 
surprise that the beacon of developed thinking shines brightly on it; the great influence of 
rationality in philosophy has trickled down to pedagogy. To educators, finding the answer to 
questions of how to think, and more importantly, of how to teach how to think is of prime interest.  
In the recent decades, the teaching of reflection has emerged as one of the promising candidates. 
In multiple disciplines and professional fields,6-9 particularly in teachers’ education and the health 
science professions, reflection has gained a tremendous foothold. In medicine10-12 and in 
nursing13-15 for example, reflection is viewed as a crucial component of curriculum and practice.16-
18 For many, it is held to be a requirement for life-long personal and professional learning.19 It has 
been widely adopted by practitioners as evidenced by the myriad applications that have been 
developed based on it, such as learning journals,20 portfolios,21, 22 supervision,23 or even 
curricula.24, 25 In current areas of research, assessment, and teaching in education, reflection is 
omnipresent. 
But to stress the importance of a construct informs us very little about the construct itself. While 
the literature on reflection is predominantly concerned with underlining the importance and 
applications of reflection, knowing that reflection is a significant element of pedagogy does not 
contribute knowledge on what reflection is. Yet, understanding how—or if—the construct of 
reflection differs from that of thinking in general is needed for reflection to provide its purported 
benefits in practice. Because how to reflect cannot be taught if the process of reflection is 
ambiguous, to understand what reflection truly entails is a key prerequisite before teaching it. For 
the construct of reflection to be useful, its constitutive elements, the ways it operates, and the 
ways by which it generates its effects must be clearly delineated. 
Before and concurrently to its uptake by practitioners, reflection has attracted the attention of 
theorists. As evidence of its popularity to scholars, it has been the subject of inquiry, development, 
and interpretation by many influential authors.26-28 A considerable number of definitions and 
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models of reflection have been established and have attempted to clarify it.10, 11, 29, 30 Perhaps a 
fallout of its popularity and development in many different fields, contexts, and with different 
goals, reflection has come to take many forms creating an imprecise meaning.31-33 Reflection has 
become an arcane construct for which there is no widely accepted definition or conceptualization, 
which has notably impaired its operationalization.34-36  
Although the myriad models of reflection in use contributes to a divergent understanding of 
reflection, the major paths of divergence can be traced back to a few influential authors. By 
retracing our steps backwards to the origins of reflection in education, it will be perhaps possible 
to untangle the current confusion. Any reflection on reflection will be more intelligible following 
a broad overview of major theorists. Starting with the great John Dewey, we will move forward in 
time and ideas to examine other leading authors and their contributions to our current view of 
reflection.  
Major authors and contributions to reflection 
Dewey and the birth of reflection in education 
If the dawn of reflection in philosophy occurred in Greece, it was in America that reflection 
emerged as a construct in education. The roots of contemporary reflection hail from John Dewey, 
considered by many to be the father of reflection. As both a philosopher and an educator, Dewey 
was interested in the questions of how to conduct our thoughts and how to educate young minds 
to conduct theirs. At the crossroads of philosophy and education, he was well positioned to coin 
the first definition of reflection. In his seminal book How we think, published in 1910, Dewey 
defines reflective thought as: 
“Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form 
of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further 
conclusion to which it tends.” 37 
For Dewey, reflection is a specific mode of thought, to be distinguished from others such as belief, 
invention, and stream of consciousness.38 Every reflective operation involves two subprocesses 
that Dewey reports as a “state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt” and an “investigation directed 
toward bringing to light further facts which serve to corroborate or to nullify the suggested 
8 
 
belief.” 37 The process of reflection originates with uncertainty and develops with the search of a 
resolution to this uncertainty by contemplation of the underlying factors contributing to it. It is 
this “[d]emand for the solution of a perplexity [that] is the steadying and guiding factor in the 
entire process of reflection.” 
To Dewey, reflection is at its essence a thought process—a cognitive process. But he was also well 
aware of affective repercussions in learning and in reflection. In his analysis of Dewey’s work, 
Rodgers identifies four attitudes conducive to reflective thought: whole-heartedness, 
responsibility, directness, and open-mindedness.38 As described by Dewey, reflection is a specific 
thought process influenced by the wider context of affective dimensions, attitudes, and 
environment. 
Dewey being one of the founders of the school of Pragmatism, the meaning of his work can best 
be understood in the broader context of education, democracy, and society. Democracy was of 
the utmost importance to Dewey, and to him, education was the indispensable instrument to its 
development and continuation. In The School and Society, Dewey remarked that “[d]emocracy 
has to be born anew every generation and education is its midwife.”39 Society is dependent on 
democracy, democracy on education, education on learning, and learning on reflection.  
Reflection starts at the smaller individual scale, where its end is to inform learning and education. 
In Education and Experience,40 Dewey positions reflection as the key element of his new proposed 
epistemology of learning. Instead of relying on traditional views of education, he devises a theory 
of experience that could be the basis of progressive education. In it, the learner’s experiences are 
the elemental building blocks of learning. Through reflection the experiences are apprehended 
and reflected upon to create meaning. By having trained one’s thought to “think well”, that is with 
curiosity, suggestion (to Dewey a combination of ease, extent, and depth), and with orderliness,37 
reflection procures the learner with continued growth. 
Extended to the societal scale, the construct of reflection is envisioned by Dewey with greater 
purpose than the sole development of thinking. To Dewey, reflection is the key means to the 
greater end of perpetuation of democracy in society. 41 In My Pedagogical Creed, Dewey 
professed that “[t]hrough education society can formulate its own purposes, can organize its own 
means and resources, and thus shape itself with definiteness and economy in the direction in 
9 
 
which it wishes to move.”42 Because one of the foundations of his view of education is reflection, 
clearly Dewey had great societal motives for it. 
Dewey was the first contemporary author to conceptualize reflection. He defined reflection by 
what it is, i.e., a distinct form of thinking requiring precise characteristics. As a pragmatist, he also 
described reflection by its purpose and in its wider context, i.e., an indispensable means for 
learning, for education, and ultimately for democracy. In his work on reflection, Dewey has been 
uniquely encompassing by characterizing it in such a threefold manner: by definition, purpose, 
and context. As such, it is unsurprising that major features of his conceptualization of reflection 
still hold more than 100 years after their inception. 
Habermas’ emancipatory reflection 
Among the founding figures of reflection, Habermas is arguably the one with the less concern for 
the inner structure and precise definition of reflection. A philosopher of the Frankfurt school, 
Habermas was rather interested in the role of reflection within critical theory. Critical theory views 
the primary goal of philosophy as the assessment and overcoming of oppressive social structures, 
“to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.”43 Whereas Dewey was 
concerned both with individual and societal consequences of reflection at the level of the 
learners, Habermas’ interest in reflection laid almost solely within its function at the level of 
society. To Habermas, reflection has a sociological function well before an educational one.   
In Knowledge and Human Interests,44 published in 1971, Habermas reacts to what he viewed as a 
sweeping current of “elimination of epistemology in favor of unchained universal ‘scientific 
knowledge’.” He objects to the omnipresence of positivism and the regression of the prevailing 
level of reflection as a result. To Habermas, knowledge can never be dissociated from the human 
interests that it originates from. This is referred to by Habermas as “knowledge-constitutive 
interests.” Thus, because knowledge—even scientific—emanates from particular interests, 
scientific methods cannot occult the need for epistemology and a justification for the foundation 
of that knowledge. Albeit without providing a clear image of what it entails, Habermas describes 
self-reflection as a means to render conscious the link between knowledge and its related human 
interests. By making conscious the underlying linkage of knowledge and interests and by negating 
the objectivism that falsely conceals the connection between them, self-reflection becomes a tool 
to develop new and less-constrained knowledge. 
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Habermas identifies three domains of knowledge where self-reflection can unfold.44, 45 The first is 
the technical area, involving empirical-analytic methods; this domain is exemplified by the natural 
sciences that seek to control and manipulate the environment (e.g., physics, geology). The second 
area is the practical area, involving historical-hermeneutic methods; this domain is exemplified 
by social and cultural sciences that seek to clarify communication and subjective but mutual 
understanding (e.g., history, theology). The third is the emancipatory and liberation area, 
involving self-knowledge and the treatment of normative problems of the human condition and 
context, as exemplified by the critical social sciences.46, 47 It is within the last domain that full self-
reflection occurs and where “knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains congruence with the 
interest in autonomy and responsibility.”44 To Habermas, self-reflection in full power will lead 
towards justice, equality, and freedom. 
Although Habermas’ works is at times “convoluted” and “not easily accessible to educators,”47 his 
influence on the understanding of reflection is still manifest today. One lasting contribution is that 
reflection ultimately has a purpose of emancipation. Another is his typology of the three domains 
where reflection can occur (technical, practical and emancipatory), and how they differ among 
themselves. Most importantly perhaps, he gave rise to the acceptance that reflection—not only 
empiricism or positivism—could be a valid method of knowledge generation. By observing that 
some disciplines developed “out of the professionalized realms of action that require practical 
wisdom”44 and where empirical-analytic methods are insufficient, Habermas heralded Schön and 
his coining of reflective practice. 
Schön’s reflective practice 
By coining the concept of “reflective practice,” Schön massively stimulated the interest in and 
uptake of reflection. This holds particularly true in the areas of professional practice, where Schön 
is by far the most cited author.48  
It is interesting to note that the most popular author on reflection was more influenced by the 
father of reflection than what is commonly reported: Schön’s Ph.D. thesis was about Dewey’s 
theory of inquiry.49  This can come as a surprise because the works of Dewey and Schön are often 
pitted at polar opposites, the former presenting a rationalist-technicist model and the latter an 
experiential-intuitive model.50 The detachment came about because of their conflicting views on 




A need for a new epistemology of professional practice 
In The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action,26 published in 1983, Schön 
alludes to a “[c]risis of confidence in professional knowledge.” To Schön, this crisis developed out 
of the inadequacy of the then dominant model of professional knowledge: technical rationality. 
Originating from an “increasingly powerful scientific world-view,” technical rationality is the 
“positivist epistemology of practice.” To Schön, technical rationality served as the inadequate 
justification for applying “the achievements of science and technology to the well-being of 
mankind.” First gaining prominence in disciplines such as medicine and engineering, it spread to 
social sciences in fields such as education, social work, or planning. According to Schön, technical 
rationality can be well adapted to disciplines where thinking can be separated from doing, and 
where means can be differentiated from ends, such as medicine or engineering. But it inevitably 
reaches its limits in fields such as education or social work, where theory and action are fused, 
and when what matters more is action rather than thoughts. Schön later submits that professional 
practice in medicine and engineering are more akin to education and social work than is 
commonly accepted. Indeed, to Schön, all professional practice entails a certain degree of fusion 
between theory and action, between means and ends. In all practice, the process of problem 
setting (determining the ends) is as important as the process of problem solving (determining 
means). And because technical rationality is only concerned with problem solving, it can only 
partially explain professional knowledge. The “[c]omplexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness 
and value-conflict” of practice “do not fit the model of technical rationality.” Professional practice 
was in need of a new foundation for its knowledge, of a new epistemology. 
By examining real-life practice in five professions, Schön contributed one such epistemology of 
professional practice: reflection-in-action. Far from the rigors of technical rationality, Schön 
postulated that the expertise of professionals arose from “professional artistry” which derives 
from knowing-in-action and develops through reflection-in-action. In the aforementioned book 
and the subsequent Educating the Reflective Practitioner,49 he investigates and describes how 
reflection-in-action works and how to educate professionals to become reflective practitioner. 
Knowing-in-action and reflection-in-action 
Unfortunately, often writing with metaphors and examples,51 Schön does not provide an explicit 
model or formal definition of reflection or reflection-in-action.35 He did however expose the 
unfolding “‘moments’ in a process of reflection-in-action” and, quite importantly, its relation with 
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knowing-in-action.49 Indeed, reflection-in-action can only be understood in relation to knowing-
in-action, which Schön relates to “the sorts of know-how we reveal in our intelligent action,” 
where “the knowing is in the action.” Knowing-in-action is a knowledge that “we are 
characteristically unable to make […] verbally explicit.” Expanding on the concept of tacit 
knowledge from Polanyi’s The Tacit Dimension,52 Schön posits that this tacit knowing-in-action is 
the basis for the “competence practitioners sometimes display in unique, uncertain, and 
conflicted situations of practice.” Even if it cannot always explicated, it clearly exists, just as an 
artist’s artistry exists without having to be verbally explicated, or as a skilled physician can 
sometimes immediately recognize a disease without consciousness of the clues that have 
triggered the diagnosis.  
From this knowing-in-action, Schön reports that there are situations where the habitual actions 
and routine responses of knowing-in-action “produce a surprise—an unexpected outcome […] 
that does not fit the categories of our knowing-in-action.” The usual action has not been met with 
the usual response. This is where reflection-in-action kicks in.  
To Schön, reflection-in-action has a “critical function” of “questioning the 
assumptional structure of knowing-in-action,” and makes us “think critically 
about the thinking that got us into this fix or this opportunity.”  
For reflection-in-action to attain this critical function, Schön outlines a four-element structure. 
The first element involves questioning the frame of the current situation to reframe it differently. 
This means that “we may, in the process, restructure strategies of action, understandings of 
phenomena, or ways of framing problems.” The second element calls for the use of past 
experiences of knowing-in-action as a fund of exemplars to be activated and to inform the present 
(re)framing of the problem at hand. The two first elements assist in developing a new 
understanding diverging from—but related to—the starting knowing-in-action. The third element 
revolves around experimentation, what Schön’s call “on-the-spot experiment.” The newly 
developed viewpoint and frame of understanding leads us to “try out new actions intended to 
explore the newly observed phenomena, test our tentative understandings of them, or affirm the 
moves we have invented to change things for the better.” This experimentation-in-action allows 
for continuous reappraisal of knowing-in-action with reflection-in-action. The fourth element is 
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the stance of the practitioner towards inquiry. Reflection-in-action asks for the practitioner to be 
both agent and experient,26 spectator and manipulator of the experimentation; this is quite unlike 
technical rationality which requires “objectivity, control, and distance.” In actuality, Schön 
stresses that these elements are rarely as definite as they are made out to be. Because they 
unravel in action, they can appear to be fused, particularly to observers. 
Reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action 
In addition to reflection-in-action, Schön described reflection-on-action. Whereas reflection-in-
action happens in an “action-present—a period of time […] during which we can still make a 
difference to the situation at hand,” reflection-on-action happens after the fact. In reflection-in-
action, thinking and action are linked; in reflection-on-action, they are separated. In the latter, we 
try to “discover how our knowing-in-action may have contributed to an unexpected outcome” in 
tranquility or during a pause from the action, akin to Dewey’s view of reflection as the “attentive, 
persistent, and careful consideration of any belief.” Hence, one manifest difference between 
reflection-in and on-action is the context of timing of the reflection; one occurs during the action, 
and the other following it. It is unclear in Schön’s works if there are further differences, e.g., in 
the structure of reflection-in-action and of reflection-on-action, or if they are the identical mental 
activities, differing only in their time context.33 
Schön’s strong imprint on reflection 
Notwithstanding imprecisions in Schön’s account of his views on reflection, his imprint on its 
current understanding in indubitable. Firstly, because Schön was interested in and wrote 
extensively about professional expertise, he has been instrumental to the uptake of reflection and 
reflective practice by educators in areas of professional practice. Secondly, he gave credibility to 
forms of knowledge not produced within the technical rationality epistemology. By providing 
convincing arguments for reflection-in-action, Schön was able to restore the value of experience 
over theory in professional practice. Thirdly, although their distinctiveness is unclear, the 
description of both reflection-in/on-action has given educators a better grasp of the reflection 
and how it might be structured. 
Kolb’s experiential learning  
From professional practice back to education; from Schön, we now turn to Kolb and his 
Experiential Learning,27 published in 1984, shortly after the Reflective Practitioner. It is surprising 
to discover how little Kolb writes about reflection in comparison to the tremendous impact he has 
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had on it. Nowhere in his works does Kolb define reflection or describe its structure, yet he is one 
of the most cited authors on reflection.48 What his works does accomplish is to ground the 
construct of reflection within his Experiential Learning process, the extensively adopted 
framework that he developed.27 Borrowing Lewin’s Experiential Learning Model and its cycle of 
four constitutive poles (concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization, 
and active experimentation),53 Kolb expands it with the works of Piaget and Dewey to build his 
theory of experiential learning.27 Kolb’s resulting unifying model retains the four original poles but 
does away with the cycle to delineate and detail the direct linkage between experience, reflection, 
conceptualization and experimentation.  
Contrary to Schön who separated theory from experience (technical rationality from professional 
artistry), Kolb was concerned with providing a solid linkage between these prima facie opposed 
realities. His experiential learning model bridges theory and practice by having reflection play the 
critical function of intermediary between the three other poles. Starting with concrete 
experience, reflective observation can lead to conceptualization or active experimentation. 
Conversely, starting with conceptualization or experimentation, one can use reflection to relate 
them to past concrete experiences. To Kolb, this transfer—facilitated by reflection—from one 
pole to another is a key factor in the process creating knowledge, i.e., learning. Reflection is thus 
conceived first and foremost as a process; because it is a process, the nature of reflection is 
understood by Kolb through its relations to others concepts, and not by what this reflective 
process is per se. Consequently, with the works of Kolb, the construct of reflection did not gain a 
new definition nor greater intrinsic understanding. But reflection did gain a new position and 
purpose in providing learning from experience. 
Boud, Keogh, and Walker’s affective activities 
Kolb’s view of reflection as a process having the key purpose of creating meaning and learning 
from experience was taken on by Boud, Keogh, and Walker who made it central to their 
understanding of reflection. In their book Reflection: Turning Experience into Learning, published 
in 1985, Boud et al. define “reflection in the context of learning” as 
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 “a generic term for those intellectual and affective activities in which 
individuals engage to explore their experiences in order to lead to new 
understandings and appreciations.”28 
It is unmistakable that to them—as to Kolb—the defining characteristic of reflection first consists 
of its role as the process that turns experience into learning. Unlike Kolb who provided little detail 
on how reflection operates to turn experience into learning, Boud et al. formulate a model for the 
reflective process specifying how “behavior, ideas, and feelings” (experiences) are processed by 
reflection and bring about “new perspectives on experience, change in behavior, readiness for 
application, and commitment to action” (learning outcomes).  
The key components of the reflective processes are organized in three stages. The first is 
“returning to experience” to “replay the experience” and “stand back from the immediacy of the 
experience.” This provides the learner with data for subsequent processing by viewing the 
experience from other perspectives and by becoming aware of new ideas and feelings arousing 
from it. The second stage is “attending to feelings;” in this stage, we utilize positive feelings and 
removes obstructing feelings “in a way that enables us to regain our flexibility and creativity in 
responding” to our appraisal of the experience. The third stage is “reevaluating experience” which 
involves examination of the emerging data from the previous two stages. Boud et al. outline four 
elements of the process of reevaluation that “can contribute to reflection and enhances its 
outcomes.” These are association, the “relating of new data to that which is already known;” 
integration, the “seeking [of] relationships among the data;” validation, the “determin[ation] of 
authenticity of the ideas and feeling which have resulted;” and appropriation, the “making [of] 
knowledge one’s own.” As learners undergo these three stages and use the four elements of 
reevaluation of experience, their experience are reflectively processed and lead to new cognitive 
outcomes, including “a new way of doing something, the clarification of an issue, […] or the 
resolution of a problem.” Reflection also leads to outcomes of an affective nature, such as 
“changes in our emotional state, our attitudes or sets of values.”  
By proposing both a definition and model for reflection, Boud et al. have bolstered the 
understanding of reflection. Among their various contributions, their most remarkable is without 
doubt their emphasis on the affective dimensions in reflection, which feature prominently in both 
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their model and definition. With Dewey, Habermas, Schön, the conceptualization of reflection 
was predominantly removed from emotions, with Kolb partly accounts for it; following Boud et 
al. the conceptualization of reflection is as affective as it is cognitive. 
Moon and the ill-structured nature and material of reflection  
Moon’s work is the last stop in our broad overview of theorists of reflection. She published 
Reflection in Learning & Professional Development in 1999,33 with some hindsight with regards to 
the significance of the contributions of previous theorists. The result is an encompassing study of 
reflection that is well informed by previous theories and by common-sense views of it, but also 
by her pragmatic concern to clarify the concept of reflection for educators in everyday practice.  
Moon attentively considers the similarities and discrepancies in preceding conceptualizations of 
reflection before producing her own. One of Moon’s key conclusion is that reflection is concerned 
with “complicated, ill-structured ideas” and situations of uncertainty.30 This echoes Dewey’s 
“perplexity, hesitation, doubt” or Schön’s “unexpected outcome […] that does not fit the 
categories of our knowing-in-action.” Because she is interested by the pedagogical application of 
reflection, Moon also recognizes that there is “close association with, or involvement in, learning 
and the representation of learning” and reflection. To Moon, reflection is: 
“a mental process with purpose and/or outcome in which manipulation of 
meaning is applied to relatively complicated or unstructured ideas in learning 
or to problems for which there is no obvious solution.”33 
To arrive at this definition, Moon establishes that the multiple views of reflection can be 
incorporated into an “input-outcome process,” where inputs are the “what we know” that are 
processed by reflection to produce outcomes representing the “purposes for which we would 
reflect.” To Moon, differences in models of reflection in the literature can be accounted for by 
their different outcomes and purposes. But considering that neither the outcomes nor the 
purpose characterize reflection in of themselves, she submits that the core process of reflection 
is common to all models and that “apparent differences in the literature of reflection relate not 
to the process itself but to its different applications and framework of guidance that shape 
these.”33 Reflection is, at its essence, a mental process that manipulates meaning applied to 
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complex ideas. By answering questions of “what to reflect about,” “how to reflect,” “what to 
reflect for,” “where is reflection applied,” in attempts to coordinate the models, Moon has 
provided a framework for analysis of reflection that is perhaps more compelling than the 
definition she devised using them. These questions foster an understanding of reflection that is 
multifaceted and more encompassing of the multiple views of it that have been previously 
developed. 
In her extensive inquiry about reflection and learning, Moon answers the questions of “what to 
reflect for” and “where is reflection applied,” by identifying three roles for reflection in learning: 
reflection in initial learning, reflection in the process of representation of learning, and reflection 
in the upgrading of learning. In her Map of learning and the representation of learning, she gives 
reflection critical functions in the “making meaning, working with meaning, and transformative 
learning,” and in “deep learning.”54 Because she explores reflection in the context of learning, 
Moon also expands our understanding by detailing conditions for fostering reflection (e.g., time 
and space, facilitators, institutional and emotional environments) and potential outcomes for it 
(e.g., learning or the production of further material for reflection, action or other representation 
of learning, building of theory). 
Unlike other theorists, Moon’s influence on reflection does not lie in her original contribution to 
delineating its fundamental features. Rather, as a pragmatic theorist and educator interested in 
applying reflection in real-life contexts, Moon questioned, refined, and clarified reflection and its 




Research problem and purpose 
Our examination of reflection, from John Dewey to Jennifer Moon, provides a better grasp of its 
conceptualization according to major theorists. A survey of the leading definitions and models of 
reflection provides an indicative account of what reflection is and how it came about. Had all 
theorists and educators worked with or expanded the same core model of reflection, a consensual 
understanding might have emerged. Unfortunately, because this has patently not been the case, 
there are important incompatibilities in both theoretical underpinnings and practical applications 
of reflection.34-36 To resolve the current complexity and contradictions of reflection, what is 
needed, in addition to an overview of authors, is a scrutiny of why and where the aforementioned 
interpretations of reflection clash.  
In this section, we identify how discrepancies and uncertainties in ways of characterizing 
reflection have resulted in a confused application of reflection. Informed by this analysis, we 
outline the central elements and criteria for our research process that aims to define and model 
reflection. 
The confusion and insufficiencies of common conceptualizations of reflection  
Reflection has been of interest to many theorists who have each emphasized different and 
divergent characteristics of reflection to create their model of reflection. Compared to one 
another, current models appear individually incomplete yet are impossible to fully harmonize. 
Case in point, it is impossible to reconcile Boud et al.’s exploration of experience to create 
meaning with Schön’s reflection-in-action involving “thinking on our feet” in an “action-present” 
as both an “agent and experient” of experimentation. Because of the lack of clarity that has 
resulted from the host of existing models, additional authors have put forth even more models13, 
19, 55-57 attempting to mitigate the lack of standardization, but in fact only compounding the 
problem. 
The difficulties in defining reflection are not an exception in the broader context of pedagogical 
concepts or processes; in education, reflection is only a particular case where matters of definition 
are unresolved. Other concepts like competence, motivation, or intelligence come to mind. Thus, 
although what follows is directly related to reflection, the analysis could probably be applied to 
other pedagogical concepts. 
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Defining reflection as an exemplar of defining a pedagogical process: extrinsic definitions 
of reflection 
We have presented six models of reflection that can be grouped on the basis of how the process 
of reflection is defined: extrinsically or intrinsically. Kolb’s model of reflection is the most 
extrinsically-defined. As discussed, Kolb characterizes reflection by its relation with—and 
distinction from—the other elements of his experiential learning model. This can be termed a 
context-driven definition of reflection. Getting a sense of where reflection is situated in the 
context of a model which encompasses it does help us delineate what reflection is not, but less 
what reflection is. Kolb’s context-driven definition of reflection structures its surrounding 
environment but not its inner working and requirements, which can be a cause for confusion in 
understanding and operationalization. 
Another extrinsically characterized description of reflection is Habermas’ emancipatory 
reflection. To Habermas, the most developed form of self-reflection must lead to justice, equality, 
and freedom. There is little doubt that emancipation might be more easily attained through 
reflection, but it is another thing altogether to define reflection as such. In doing so, Habermas 
has coined an outcome-driven definition of reflection. Even if a definition driven by outcome is 
more informative than one driven by solely by context, significant issues remain. First, defining 
reflection by what it must ideally and eventually lead to overlooks major differences between the 
outcome of reflection and the process of reflection. There is a difference between practicing the 
violin and virtuously performing a concerto; because a process will perhaps rarely lead to its 
desired outcome, defining it by its outcome incurs the risk of negating valid and useful processes 
that can fall short in immediately producing the prescribed outcome. The second major issue, 
which afflicts both context- and purpose-driven definitions of reflection, is more critical: they 
reveal very little about how to foster its development. If reflection is this process that helps 
learners learn, but educators know little about the process itself—save for its context or 
outcome—it become particularly arduous to help learners learn. Extrinsically defined reflection 
can be helpful in the understanding of reflection, but will always be insufficient by itself to direct 
its application and transfer to learners. 
Defining reflection as an exemplar of defining a pedagogical process: intrinsic definitions 
or models of reflection 
What follows is that definitions or models of reflection that characterize it by what it is in itself, 
i.e., intrinsic definitions of reflection, are more useful than extrinsic ones. This holds particularly 
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true with regards to teaching, which is greatly facilitated when a pedagogical concept 
characterized from within. Dewey’s definition of reflection is one example of definition that does 
not call for an outside reference to context or outcomes. Defining reflection as “active, persistent 
and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds 
that support it and the further conclusion to which it tends”37 communicates accurately what 
reflection is in itself and thus allows for better grasp of its nature. Although Boud et al.’s definition 
of reflection (“a generic term for those intellectual and affective activities in which individuals 
engage to explore their experiences in order to lead to new understandings and appreciations”28) 
is chiefly an outcome-driven definition, their model comprises three aforementioned stages that 
define the inner structure of reflection. By intrinsically characterizing reflection, Boud et al. 
contribute an example of a structure-driven model of reflection, which allows for superior 
understanding—and, most notably, fostering—of what reflection entails. 
In the same vein, some structure-driven models of reflection are also sequence-driven models; in 
addition to characterizing the essential elements of reflection, sequence-driven models order 
them. Boud et al.’s preceding model of reflection is an example where the key subprocesses of 
reflection are ordered. Many other proposed models of reflection are organized in such a way.13, 
58 While adding a sequence to reflection can help to outline and unscramble it, it does so by 
formalizing an added ordering constraint that might not be mandatory. The previously noted 
incompatibility between Boud et al.’s view of reflection on experience and Schön’s reflection-in-
action is largely due to a chronological bounding of reflection in the former. 
Threats to application and validity of reflection 
Because reflection has been too loosely defined by extrinsic definitions (context-driven or 
outcome-driven) or too rigidly by sequence-driven models, and has been expanded in diverging 
directions, in multiple disciplines, there remains a lack of a clear core meaning for it. But in light 
of the increasing publications on the subject of reflection, this limitation has not prevented eager 
researchers and educators from developing myriad applications that are purportedly reflective.19-
23, 55 Unfortunately, the development of applications of reflection using an imprecise 
conceptualization has arguably magnified the problem of comprehending the theory of reflection 
even further. 
Despite the increasing number of publications, the evidence in support of the use of reflection 
remains mainly theoretical.11 The dearth of empirical proof of its practical effectiveness is, to the 
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very least, attributable to the difficulty in reliably operationalizing a construct without a consistent 
definition (or conversely to define a construct that has been operationalized in differing ways).59, 
60 This is expected because as each author has a unique affiliation and following, multiple 
disparate models and definitions of reflection are currently in usage. These resulting 
conceptualizations have widened but also diluted the common meaning of reflection, which has 
at times been equated to simple thinking.31, 61 Indeed, there currently does not exist a definition 
or model of reflection that is both sufficiently complete and discerning of the elements of 
reflection described by its major theorists. It is not simply when the word reflection is used that 
reflection occurs, or when an application is said to be reflective that it is.  
The lack of consensual definition of reflection has without doubt impeded the development of a 
corpus of tools to reliably analyze, measure and assess reflection.62 In order to legitimately use 
the construct of reflection in practice, it is crucial to be able to first reliably identify it and 
distinguish it from other related but different constructs or processes. Only then might the 
operationalization of reflection provide its alleged benefits and evidence for the usefulness of 
reflection be empirically verified. Continuing on the path of confusion and uncertainty will only 
increase threats to the validity of reflection.35, 62 
Research question: What is reflection and how to define it? 
Sir Francis Bacon observed four hundred years ago that “truth will sooner come out from error 
than from confusion.”63 For reflection, this is not to say that a unique truth can be identified; 
rather, it is to say that reducing the haziness and singling out discrepancies between models will 
help to shine new light and better knowledge on reflection. Previous scholars and researchers 
have taken heed of the lack of understanding of reflection and have published excellent reviews 
on the general concept of reflection,15, 29 particularly in medical education.10, 11 The aim of most 
was primarily to review the existing literature, without the set purpose of ensuring that all articles 
referred to reflection as a clearly defined and uniform construct. A few have attempted to 
specifically clarify the definition of reflection, but without using a formal systematic process 
having the set aim of providing a unified definition.7, 38, 64 For both the newcomer and the expert 
reflection remains a complex construct, difficult to grasp, to vulgarize, and thus to teach. 
Reflection is vitally in need of a standard definition and model for reflection.  However, any 
proposal of yet another conceptualization of reflection bears the inherent possibility of further 
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compounding the complexity of what reflection truly encompasses. To prevent this and build a 
new definition and model for reflection from the ground up that will achieve widespread 
acceptance and adoption, five key criteria will direct our research and thematic analysis 
processes.  
1. Structure-driven definition and model 
We have already reported on inherent pitfalls in ways of defining pedagogical processes; thus, 
our first criterion is to coin a conceptualization of reflection that is structure-driven. Even if the 
context, purpose, and sequence of reflection are potentially meaningful adjuncts to the 
understanding of reflection, we will attempt to define reflection without these added constraints. 
Reflection must be defined intrinsically by what it is in itself. 
2. Systematic representativeness 
All authors have unquestionably been informed by antecedent conceptualizations of reflection 
before putting forth their own. Resolving effectively the variability and unifying the existing 
conceptualizations can only be achieved by accounting for all the major theorists that have shaped 
reflection as it is understood today. We will use a systematic process to identify the most 
influential models of reflection to ensure the representativeness of the resulting model. This will 
strengthen the resulting model with greater exhaustiveness and face-validity. 
3. Discriminative ability 
The discriminative ability of a definition can be understood as its diagnostic ability to the question: 
is reflection present? This means being able to use the definition to determine clearly and reliably 
whether reflection is fully present, partly present, or absent, and the reasons for one or the other. 
This is necessary because any gain in representativeness in the conceptualization of reflection 
comes with potential loss in its precision. To minimize this possibility, exhaustiveness of elements 
in the construct of reflection will need to be counterbalanced by discrimination of what is 
consistently required from what is useful and ancillary—but not mandatory—in reflection. This 
will allow reflection to be very richly described and analyzed, while keeping its essential features 
easy to diagnose.  
4. Context-independence and content-independence 
It has already been mentioned that the definition of reflection should not be driven by its context 
or relations with other concepts such as experience; this can be prevented by defining reflection 
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intrinsically rather than extrinsically. But in addition to not being defined by its context, the 
definition of reflection should not even include any unneeded reference to context or content. 
Although all processes are inherently context-bound and content-bound, their definitions and 
models should seek to be as generic as possible, in order to be adaptable enough to account for 
all situations where these processes could occur. As an example, reflection does occur in time—
before, during, or after action— and can be described with regards to timing; but it should not be 
defined in such fashion. We will aim for a definition that precludes all unnecessary content or 
context constraints; reflection as conceptualized will be amenable to application in as many fields 
of study and professional practice as possible, independent of timing, level of training, or other 
contexts. 
5. Operationalization 
Perhaps the most important criterion for defining reflection is its operationalization. A fellow 
pragmatist philosopher of Dewey, William James remarked that the “pragmatic method […] is to 
try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences.”65 Accordingly, a 
definition or model will serve its purpose in its capacity to be operationalized in practice. There 
must be “some practical difference that must follow from” defining reflection in a manner rather 
than another. To be useful, a model must aim for maximum clarity and conciseness to be easily 
translatable to real-life circumstances. Reflection and its inner structure must be delineated in a 
way that strikes the right balance between intricacy that enhances reflection and intricacy that 
overburdens it and makes its application troublesome.  
Using these five criteria, we hope to be able to produce a “meta-definition” and conceptual model 
that will be structure-driven, representative, context/content-independent, discriminative, and 
operational. We believe that the resulting modeling of reflection will positively guide further 
studies and applications of reflection along more common grounds and bring us nearer to 
obtaining empirical evidence of its effectiveness. 
Methods  
With the set objective of coining a new definition and model of reflection directed by the five 
previously described criteria, we first identify the most important theorists of reflection by 
conducting a systematic review of the literature. We follow by extracting the main 
conceptualizations of reflection and perform a thematic analysis process to resolve and 
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discriminate essential from ancillary features of reflection. Finally, we structure and reword the 
different components of reflection to develop our definition and model of reflection. 
Systematic review 
To provide our process with greatest representativeness of conceptualizations of reflection, we 
conducted a systematic review of the literature using Medline, Embase, and PsycINFO (Ovid 
interface) with [reflection, reflective or reflective practice] AND [learning, professional practice, 
and medical education] as keywords, for articles pertaining to reflection in education. To sample 
the most contemporary application of reflection, we limited the query to papers published in 
English from 2008 to 2012. We screened papers obtained to retain only those that included a 
discussion on the definition of reflection. Of the 430 results obtained, 72 articles (18 reviews) 
included such discussions. From these papers, we extracted references to 74 distinct authors each 
with their unique conceptualization of reflection.  
As a way to objectively quantify the relative importance of each author on the current 
understanding of reflection, we determined the number of times each was cited by the 72 papers. 
Using this total number of citations as a measure of influence, we kept the fifteen most influential 
for further analysis. Unsurprisingly, Schön and Dewey were the most often cited theorists of 
reflection (all 72 articles referred to Schön and 44 to Dewey). Although the number of citations 
per author varied (ranging all 72 articles citing Schön’s to 8 citing Atkins and Murphy), our goal 
was to obtain a wide range of influential conceptualizations for analysis and reach saturation 
rather than to compare the relative influence of each author. 
The articles and works of each fifteen author was reviewed to extract a definition of reflection. If 
no explicit definition existed, we extracted the authors’ model of reflection or the relevant 
passages where the concept is discussed. Various conceptualizations of the other identified 
theorists were also be briefly reviewed to further inform our analysis process. Figure 1, which can 
be found in article appended below, presents the flow chart for the selection of definitions and 
models. Table I, also in the article, summarizes the 15 authors and the major definitions and 
models that were extracted. 
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Exploratory thematic analysis 
With the results from the systematic review featured in Table I, we conducted an exploratory 
thematic analysis. As reported by Creswell, this consisted of iterative explorations of the data with 
comparison and refinement of identified categories.66  
At the first stage of exploration, two broad categories were identified: thinking processes and 
qualifiers of thinking processes. The qualifiers were further clustered, and this second stage of 
analysis identified seven categories encompassing the elements of reflective thinking processes. 
In naming these categories emphasis was placed on ensuring maximal context and content-
independence in labelling. The identified categories were: content, process, self, change, 
conceptual frame, trigger, and context of reflection.  
Development process of definition and model 
Pursuing the analysis process, we established which of the seven elements were constitutional to 
reflective thinking and thus warranted inclusion in a definition of reflection. To adequately define 
the construct of reflection, the following criterion was used: constitutional elements transform 
thinking processes and make them inherently reflective, while extrinsic elements influence 
thinking processes without necessarily making them reflective. We identified five constitutional 
elements (content, process, self, change, and conceptual frame) and two extrinsic elements 
(trigger and context). 
Following further analysis, we recognized that three constitutional elements were related to both 
the content and process of reflection (i.e., the other two constitutional elements). We thus better 
isolated each constitutional element by reorganizing and rewording them into five distinct core 
components, which we used to frame our draft definition. To obtain the final wording, we 
conducted iterative refinements to formulate an increasingly generic, nonlinear, integrative, 
discriminative, and operational definition. To construct our model, we analyzed the interactions 
between core components; these were outlined and supplemented with the extrinsic elements. 
Figure 2, presented in the article, summarizes the exploratory thematic analysis and development 




The article What is reflection? A conceptual analysis of major definitions and a proposal of a five-
component model is included in this master’s thesis.48 It has been published in the peer-reviewed 
Medical Education in volume 48, issue 12 in December 2014. 
The paper reports on the research process, its main findings and implications. As first author, I 
was involved in all parts of the study and redaction process. I conducted the literature review, 
conceived the design of the study, extracted and analysed the data, and drafted the manuscript. 
Nicolas Fernandez contributed to the design of the study, extracted and analysed the data, and 
drafted the manuscript. Thierry Karsenti and Bernard Charlin contributed substantially to the 
acquisition of data and provided guidance in the writing process. 
The authorization of all other authors for inclusion in this thesis was obtained. 
 
 
What is reflection? A conceptual analysis of major definitions and a 
proposal of a five-component model 
 
Quoc Dinh Nguyen1, Nicolas Fernandez2, Thierry Karsenti3, Bernard Charlin4 
 
 
1 Université de Montréal, Geriatric Medicine, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
2 Université du Québec à Montréal, Département d'éducation et formation spécialisées 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
3 Université de Montréal, Science de l'Éducation, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
4 Université de Montréal, Médecine direction – CPASS, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
 
 







Context. Although reflection is considered a significant component of medical education and 
practice, the literature does not provide a consensual definition or model for it. Because reflection 
has taken on multiple meanings, it remains difficult to operationalize. A standard definition and 
model are needed to improve the development of practical applications for reflection. 
Purpose. To identify, explore and analyze the most influential conceptualizations of reflection, and 
to develop a new, theory-informed, and unified definition and model of reflection. 
Methods. Using a systematic review, the 15 most cited authors in papers on reflection from 2008-
2012 were identified. The authors’ definitions and models were extracted. An exploratory 
thematic analysis was carried out and identified seven initial categories. Categories were 
clustered and reworded to develop an integrative definition and model of reflection, which 
feature core components that define reflection and extrinsic elements that influence instances of 
reflection. 
Results. Following our review and analysis, five core components of reflection (TA, ACEI, CF, VC, 
S) and two extrinsic elements were identified as characteristics of the reflective thinking process. 
Reflection is defined as “the process of engaging the self (S) in attentive, critical, exploratory, and 
iterative (ACEI) interactions with one’s thoughts and actions (TA), and their underlying conceptual 
frame (CF), with a view to changing them and a view on the change itself (VC).” Our conceptual 
model consists of the defining core components, supplemented with the extrinsic elements that 
influence reflection. 
Conclusion. This article presents a new theory-informed five-component definition and model of 
reflection, which we believe have advantages compared to previous models to help guide further 





Since first coined by Dewey in 1933,1 reflection has gained traction in multiple disciplines and 
professional fields.2-5 Medicine,6-8 nursing,9-11 and the other health science professions12 are no 
exception, where reflection is viewed as a crucial component of curriculum and practice,13-15 and 
as a requirement for life-long personal and professional learning.16 In the last 80 years, reflection 
has been the subject of inquiry, development, and interpretation by many influential authors, 
notably Schön, and his coining of reflective practice.17 As evidence of its popularity, reflection has 
taken on divergent meanings and has been represented by a number of models,6, 7 each 
emphasizing different elements required in reflection (e.g. “active, persistent and careful 
consideration of any belief,”1 “affective activities”18, assumptions,17, 19 or “meanings in terms of 
self”20). For both newcomers and experts, reflection is a complex construct, for which the 
literature does not provide a consensual definition.21-24 
The lack of a common explicit understanding of reflection has undoubtedly impeded the 
development of practical methods to analyze, teach, and assess it.25, 26 Despite the increasing 
number of publications on reflection, the evidence in support of its use remains mainly 
theoretical,7 largely due to the difficulty in reliably operationalizing a construct without a 
consistent definition.27, 28 While practical applications of reflection have been described,29-31 the 
imprecise understanding of reflection has often resulted in its meaning being diluted, and at times 
equated to simple thinking.32, 33 A standard definition of reflection is needed to help guide further 
studies and applications for learners, teachers, and researchers, along common grounds.28, 34 
Purpose 
Previous researchers have published excellent systematic reviews on the general concept of 
reflection in medical education.6, 7 A few have attempted to specifically clarify the definition of 
reflection,3, 35, 36  without using a formal systematic process having the set aim of providing a 
unified definition. Because multiple models and definitions of reflection are currently in usage, 
widespread acceptance of yet another conceptualization of reflection can only be achieved by 
accounting for the major ones previously described. To that effect, this article first presents a 
systematic review of major definitions and models of reflection. We identify their common 
underlying structure and reorganize their key elements to develop an integrative “meta-
definition”. We finally supplement our definition with a conceptual model and discuss their 




Definition and model retrieval and extraction 
We conducted a systematic literature review using Medline, Embase and PsycINFO (Ovid 
interface) with [reflection, reflective or reflective practice] AND [learning, professional practice, 
and medical education] as keywords, for articles pertaining to reflection in education. We limited 
the query to papers published in English from 2008 to 2012. Of the 430 results obtained and 
screened, 72 articles (18 reviews) included discussions on the definition of reflection. We 
extracted references to 74 authors from these articles and retained the 15 most frequently cited 
authors. Although the number of citations per author varied (ranging from 72 articles citing Schön 
to 8 citing Atkins and Murphy), our goal was to obtain a wide range of influential 
conceptualizations for analysis rather than to compare the relative influence of each author. 
Figure 1 presents the flow chart for the selection of authors and definitions. 
QDN reviewed the articles and works of authors to identify a definition of reflection; when none 
was available, QDN and NF extracted the author’s model of reflection or the relevant passages 
where the concept is discussed. Table I summarizes the 15 authors and the major definitions and 




Figure 1. Flow chart for the selection of definitions 
 
 
Exploratory thematic analysis 
Using the results in Table I, QDN conducted the thematic analysis process. This consisted of 
iterative explorations of the data with comparison and refinement of identified categories.37 At 
each stage, results were examined by QDN and NF, and any difference of understanding was 
discussed with all authors to achieve resolution.  
At the first stage of exploration, two broad categories were identified: thinking processes and 
qualifiers of thinking processes. The qualifiers were further clustered, and this second stage of 
analysis identified seven categories encompassing the elements of reflective thinking processes. 
These were: content, process, self, change, conceptual frame, trigger, and context of reflection.  
Development process of definition and model 
We established which of the seven elements were constitutional to reflective thinking and thus 
warranted inclusion in a definition of reflection. The following criterion was used: constitutional 
elements transform thinking processes and make them inherently reflective, while extrinsic 
elements influence thinking processes without necessarily making them reflective. We identified 
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five constitutional elements (content, process, self, change, and conceptual frame) and two 
extrinsic elements (trigger and context). 
Following further analysis, we recognized that three constitutional elements were related to both 
the content and process of reflection (the other two constitutional elements). We thus better 
isolated each constitutional element by reorganizing and rewording them into five distinct core 
components, which we used to frame our draft definition. To obtain the final wording, we 
conducted iterative refinements to formulate an increasingly generic, nonlinear, integrative and 
operational definition. To construct our model, we analyzed the interactions between core 
components; these were outlined and supplemented with the extrinsic elements. Figure 2 
summarizes the exploratory thematic analysis and development process of our definition and 
model.  
Figure 2. Exploratory thematic analysis process and development of definition and model 
  
Results 
Table I presents the 15 most cited authors and their definition or model of reflection. This 
aggregate view of reflection reveals both commonalities and discrepancies. Apart from the 
inevitable variety of wording, major differences between the definitions include (i) the concepts 
that each author included or excluded, and (ii) the level of detail and contextualization of the 
concepts. By breaking down each definition into its basic concepts, we reconciled these 
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differences to construct a unified definition of reflection, without oversimplifying or stripping it 
of its meaning.38 
Table I. Major authors and their definition or model of reflection 
Author Year Definition or model 
Dewey1 1933 
“Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed 
form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the 




Double-loop learning “occurs when error is detected and corrected in 
ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying 
norms, policies and objectives.” 
Schön17, 41 1983, 1987 
“Questioning the assumptional structures of knowing-in-action” and 





“The process of internally examining and exploring an issue of 
concern, triggered by an experience, and which creates and clarifies 
meaning in terms of self, and which results in a changed conceptual 
perspective.” 
Kolb42 1984 
Reflection is conceptualized as one stage and pole of the four-stage 




“Generic term for those intellectual and affective activities in which 
individuals engage to explore their experiences in order to lead to a 
new understanding and appreciation.” 
Korthagen43 1985 
ALACT model
“1. Action 2. Looking back at the action 3. Awareness of essential 
aspects 4. Creating alternative methods of action 5. Trial” 
Brookfield19 1990 
A process comprising three interrelated phases: 
“1. identifying the assumptions that underlie our thoughts and 
actions; 2. scrutinizing the accuracy and validity of these in terms of 
how they connect to, or are discrepant with, our experience of reality; 
3. reconstituting these assumptions to make them more inclusive and 
integrative” 
Mezirow44 1991 
“The process of critically assessing the content, process, or premise(s) 
of our efforts to interpret and give meaning to an experience. […] 
Premise reflection involves us becoming aware of why we perceive, 
think, feel or act as we do and of the reasons for and consequences of 




“1. Awareness of uncomfortable feelings and thoughts; 2. Critical 
analysis of feelings and knowledge; 3. New perspective.” 
Hatton and 
Smith45 
1995 "Deliberate thinking about action with a view to its improvement." 
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Moon46 1999, 2004 
“A form of mental processing with a purpose and/or anticipated 
outcome that s applied to relatively complex or unstructured ideas for 
which there is not an obvious solution.” 
Kember47, 48 2000, 2008 
Reflection and critical reflection are viewed as two levels on a four-
scale continuum of reflective thinking. 
Reflection “operates through a careful re-examination and evaluation 
of experience, beliefs and knowledge” and “leads to new 
perspectives;” Critical reflection, the highest level of reflection, 
“involving perspective transformation,” “necessitates a change to 





“Purposeful critical analysis of knowledge and experience, in order to 
achieve deeper meaning and understanding.” 
Sandars6 2009 
“A metacognitive process that occurs before, during and after 
situations with the purpose of developing greater understanding of 
both the self and the situation so that future encounters with the 
situation are informed from previous encounters.” 
 
The definition of reflection 
The nature of reflection: Reflection as a thinking process  
The early stages of the thematic analysis revealed that the nature of reflection, common to all the 
reviewed definitions, is first and foremost a thinking process. Dewey, who is considered the father 
of reflection, conceived of it as a distinct and specific form of thinking, rooted in the scientific 
method.36 For other authors, the act of reflection is seen as “questioning,” “thinking,” 
“examining,” “scrutinizing,” a “mental processing,” or “analysis,” all of which are cognitive 
activities. However, that reflection is a thinking process does not mean that reflecting and thinking 
are synonyms. All definitions of reflection include further elements that delineate how reflection, 
as a specific form of thinking, differs from other thinking processes. We identified seven such 
elements and classified five as constitutional to reflective thinking and two as extrinsic to it.  
The five core components of reflection 
After re-analysis and rewording to better differentiate them, the five identified constitutional 
elements yielded the core components of reflection: (i) thoughts and actions (TA), (ii) attentive, 
critical, exploratory, and iterative processes (ACEI), (iii) the underlying conceptual frame (CF), (iv) 
the view on change (VC), and (v) the self (S). These components are the key attributes that allow 
a thinking process to become reflective.  
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At their most basic, all thinking processes involve some form of content that is processed. Hence, 
if reflection is a distinct form of thinking, it must differ by its content (i.e., what one thinks about 
when reflecting) and/or by its process (i.e., how one thinks when reflecting). Accordingly, we 
classified the five core components in terms of (A) content, (B) process or (C) both content and 
process, as shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. The five core components of reflection 
 
(A) Content-related component of reflection (TA) 
The first core component we identified, thoughts and actions (TA), is related to the content of 
reflection, or “what must one think about in order to be reflecting?” The definitions do not 
provide a consistent answer to this question: “beliefs,” “experiences,” “knowledge,” “action,” 
“situation,” or “ideas”. The level of precision in descriptions of the content of reflection varies 
widely, from Boyd and Fales’ broad “issue of concern” to Schön’s specific “assumptional 
structures of knowing-in-action.” There is no easy way to integrate these divergent views, except 
to argue that one’s “thoughts and actions” (TA) would encompass the entire range of content on 
which one can reflect. The TA component is meant to include cognitive content (e.g., knowledge, 
ideas, problem-solving), non-cognitive content (e.g., actions, experience), and potential affective 
content. In Mezirow’s words, it encompasses all that one can “perceive, think, feel or act.” Thus, 
the first component of reflection is thinking about thoughts and actions. While it is true that 
reflective thinking involves thinking about thoughts and actions, such a stripped-down 
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understanding of reflection does not distinguish it from other forms of thinking. Additional 
components are required to delineate what is specific to the reflective thinking process. 
(B) Process-related component of reflection (ACEI) 
How must one think about thoughts and actions in order to be reflecting? The second component 
of reflection, the attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative component (ACEI), refers to the 
process of reflective thinking. For Dewey, one’s thinking should be “active, persistent and careful.” 
For Schön, Mezirow, and Mann et al., reflective thinking should be “critical.” Boyd and Fales and 
Boud et al. highlight the exploratory aspect of reflection. It is more important to recognize that 
reflective thinking entails a certain analytical and ameliorative way of processing one’s thoughts 
and actions rather than to pinpoint the exact, specific way. Because each author has his or her 
preference, we contend that a better approximation is that reflective thinking must be attentive, 
critical, exploratory, and iterative (ACEI). Thinking about our thoughts and actions attentively, 
critically, in an exploratory and iterative fashion does mirror more concise definitions of reflection, 
such as Hatton and Smith’s "deliberate thinking about action with a view to its improvement". 
Yet, most definitions are more elaborate, and include three additional components that refer to 
both the content and the process of reflection. 
(C) Content- and process-related components of reflection (CF, VC, S) 
An ACEI thinking process about one’s TA will inevitably blur the line between content and process. 
Because content is cognitively processed, it is inevitably transformed into a new state, which 
becomes hard to categorize as purely content- or process-related. As we discuss below, the last 
three core components (CF, VC and S) are related to both the content and process of reflection. 
The underlying conceptual frame component (CF) 
When Dewey asks one to consider “the grounds that support” one’s TA, when Schön and 
Brookfield talk about “assumptional structures” and “assumptions,” or Atkins and Murphy talk 
about “perspectives,” they are all referring to a third core component: the conscious or 
unconscious conceptual frame (CF) that underlies our thoughts and actions. For authors, 
reflection involves (i) the process of “becoming aware of” this underlying conceptual frame which 
reveals “why we perceive, think, feel or act as we do,”44 and (ii) making this underlying conceptual 
frame the new content of reflective thinking, by “scrutinizing (its) accuracy and validity.”19 In 
organizational learning, it is this questioning of the underlying conceptual frame that leads to 
Argyris and Schön’s “double-loop learning.” Thus, along with ACEI thinking about TA, reflection 
36 
 
differs from other thinking processes in that it also requires thinking aimed at “one’s 
understanding of the problem […] rather than aimed simply at trying to solve it.”24 Mezirow 
(premise reflection) and Kember (critical reflection) considered this thinking “critically about that 
thinking that got us to fix this opportunity”(in Schön’s words17) as the highest level of reflection. 
Thinking about one’s underlying conceptual frame appears to be required for reflection to occur. 
The view on change component (VC) 
Why does one reflect? The reflective thinking process also differs from general thinking in terms 
of its purpose. The majority of definitions view the purpose of reflection as leading to some form 
of change, the most explicit being Boyd and Fales’ definition, whereby reflection “creates and 
clarifies meaning” and “results in a changed conceptual perspective”. Others use less precise 
wording, such as “new,” “deeper,” or “alternative.” Having a view on change (VC) is the fourth 
core component we identified. Mezirow’s consideration of critical reflection as instrumental in 
his transformative dimensions of adult learning attests to the importance of a view on change in 
reflection. Analogous to the CF component, the VC component pertains to both the process and 
content of reflection. The aims of reflection are (i) to process one’s TA and CF in with a view to 
change (how to think) and (ii) to reprocess this envisioned change as the content of further 
reflective thinking (what to think about). By viewing how the envisioned change can be changed 
further, the reflective process can “spiral onwards” (Jay and Johnson38), involving “trial” 
(Korthagen) and experimentation (Schön17 and Ross49). One should think with the purpose of 
change in mind to be reflecting. 
The self component (S) 
Reflection stems from the Latin root reflexio- which means “a bending back.” The idea of 
reflection as a thinking process concerned with the self appears in most definitions in implicit or 
explicit form. Sandars uses the term “self,” while others use possessive adjectives such as “their” 
and “our,” or first-person pronouns such as “us” and “we.” Although a thinking process can be 
ACEI, deal with TA and CF, and aim for a VC, it becomes reflective particularly when these four 
components are linked to the fifth component, namely the self (S). The less developed models of 
reflection regard the self component as pertaining solely to the content of the reflective thinking 
process (thinking about oneself or one’s TA). However, as Boyd and Fales make clear, the self 
component is also linked to the process of reflective thinking. When clarifying “meaning in terms 
of self,” one uses the self to examine how one’s TA, CF, and VC are (i) related to the self and (ii) 
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informed by the self. There is a significant difference between thinking about something related 
to the self (where the content is related to the self, e.g. my actions) and thinking about something 
as related to the self (where the process is related to the self, e.g. what do my actions say about 
me?). Reflective thinking should include both.  
The operational definition of reflection 
Our conceptual analysis has established reflection as a specific thinking process comprising five 
distinct components (TA, ACEI, CF, VC, S), as shown in the lower portion of Figure 4. After multiple 
wording refinements, we coined the following final definition of reflection:  
The process of engaging the self in attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative interactions with 
one’s thoughts and actions, and their underlying conceptual frame, with a view to changing 
them and with a view on the change itself. 
Using this definition and its five core components as an underlying structure, Table II presents the 
15 reported definitions and their interrelationships. 
Table II. Breakdown of the definitions according to the core components of reflection 
Authors 
 Core components 
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The extrinsic elements of reflection  
Our definition introduces five core components that together define what reflection is. But 
because reflection cannot occur in a vacuum, it is also influenced by certain extrinsic elements, 
which, although not informative of the nature (i.e., definition) of reflection, add to its 
understanding. Extrinsic elements alter instances of reflective thinking processes, but do not alter 
thinking processes so as to make them reflective per se. Considering that they feature significantly 
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in our model of reflection, we will briefly discuss two extrinsic elements identified in our review 
(i.e., trigger and context of reflection), along with others reported in the literature. 
The trigger of reflection 
Boyd and Fales identify the trigger of reflection as being “experience.” As an experience triggers 
reflection, what is recognized or recalled of the experience is held on as the content to be fed into 
the reflective thinking process. Because what is recognized or recalled of an experience can differ 
widely from the actual experience, the distinction between the trigger and the actual content of 
reflection is worth emphasizing. The trigger of reflection, what Eraut calls the focus of reflection,50 
usually pertains to our thoughts and actions (TA), but should also pertain to our underlying 
conceptual frames (CF), view on change (VC), or view of self (S).  
The context of reflection 
How reflection unfolds will vary according to innumerable contextual factors such as the academic 
field, the setting, and so on.32 The most commonly mentioned contextual factor in reflection is 
timing. In his definition, Sandars specifies that reflection occurs “before, during and after 
situations.”  This mirrors Loughran’s anticipatory reflection51 (before), Schön’s “reflection-in-
action” (during), and his “reflection-on-action”41 (after). The vast majority of current definitions, 
studies, and applications of reflection are concerned with reflection that takes place after the 
situation of interest. However, because reflection varies according to the context, there is an 
added value in also describing reflection in other contexts as well (e.g., before or during the 
action).  
Other extrinsic elements of reflection 
Other definitions and models have identified more extrinsic elements characterizing reflection. 
For example, Mamede and Schmidt’s structure of reflective practice includes an “attitude of 
openness towards reflection,”52 which can be understood as the state of the person undergoing 
reflection. Boud et al. (“affective activities”) and Atkins and Murphy (“analysis of feelings”) 
describe an affective element in reflection, whereas Epstein53 and Tremmel54 relate reflection to 
mindfulness. Both Korthagen and Schön, in more elaborate descriptions, underline the 
importance and influence of a facilitator for reflection. Aukes et al. describe one outcome of 
reflection in medical practice as “the benefit of balanced functioning, learning and 
development.”16 This non-exhaustive list of extrinsic elements shows how the conceptualization 
of reflection can be extensively refined.  
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A conceptual model of reflection 
Our conceptual model of reflection, illustrated in Figure 4, builds on the five above-mentioned 
defining core components of reflection (TA, ACEI, CF, VC, and S) and supplements them with the 
influencing extrinsic elements. It depicts the extrinsic elements as separate external concepts that 
interact with and refine the core components of reflection. 
Figure 4. Conceptual model of reflection 
 
Discussion 
Multiple definitions and models currently exist and have contributed to reflection acquiring 
multiple meanings which we believe have impeded its consensual development. Lest our coining 
of another conceptualization of reflection will worsen this problem, we first present theoretical 
strengths and practical benefits of our process of defining reflection and the resulting model, 
before addressing their limitations and implications. 
Theoretical strengths of our process and model  
As shown by the numerous models cited in our review, contemporary reflection has come to 
represent more than any single author has conceived of it; to fully grasp the nature of reflection 
requires basing our understanding on more than Schön, Dewey, or Boud et al. independently. To 
the best of our knowledge, our article is the first to report on a systematic approach to define 
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reflection, improving on previous analyses based on a single author36 or on multiple authors 
without systematic sampling.3, 35 Because our approach was planned with the specific aim to unify 
the models and definitions, we have developed a new conceptualization that is uniquely 
integrative and all-encompassing. As shown in Table II, our conceptualization accounts for the key 
elements of previous models, without emphasizing one at the expense of another. This allows it 
to serve as a unification model, providing the missing features in other models (e.g., lack of a CF 
component in Boud et al.’s model and lack of a self component in Dewey and Schön’s definition). 
Furthermore, although more inclusive than previous models, we believe that our proposal strikes 
a better balance between excessive simplicity (e.g., Hatton and Smith) or complexity (e.g. 
Brookfield, Kember). Providing a clear distinction between what is the core of reflection and what 
is extrinsic to it has allowed us to coin a definition that is both representative of preceding ones 
and discriminant of what reflection truly entails. To facilitate understanding and 
operationalization, our definition uses generic wording and is self-contained, unlike, for example, 
Schön’s model, which is not easy to grasp without lengthy exploration of his writing.22  
Practical benefits of our model  
In the process of becoming more reflective, learners are regularly asked to engage in reflection. 
Generally unaware—or rather uninformed—of what reflection entails, learners attempt to 
produce reflective thinking, which is often hard to distinguish from any diligent thinking. One 
regularly reads detailed accounts of learners’ thoughts and actions (TA component), which are 
sometimes attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative (ACEI). Only seldom will learners’ 
spontaneous reflective thinking tackle the underlying conceptual frames (CF), the view on change 
(VC), and the self (S), which are critical features of reflection. The importance and value of each 
component of reflection is illustrated in Table III, which shows how thinking processes become 




Table III. An example of increasingly reflective thinking processes 
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Because our model explicitly describes the structure of reflection and its core components, it can 
be used as a basis to teach richer and more effective reflection. By including and focusing on all 
five core components in their reflective thinking, learners can experience fully developed 
reflection and clearly distinguish it from diligent thinking or generic metacognitive thinking.55 
Although reflection can be broken down into components, this does not mean that reflection can 
be equated to the sum of its parts. Even if all the components are present, reflection will unleash 
its full potential only when the systemic components interact. The most significant interaction is 
the reciprocity between one’s TA and their CF, which the reflective process should promote. This 
uniquely human capacity to “think inside the box” (thinking about our TA) and “outside the box” 
(thinking about the CF underlying our TA) is instrumental in fostering high-level reflection and in 
changing one’s way of being, doing, and thinking. Similarly, analyzing how the self explains and 
influences (or is influenced by) our thoughts and actions and our conceptual frames is 
undoubtedly key for effective reflection. Because reflection comprises both the individual 
components and the many interactions between them, it is easy to see how nonlinear, complex, 
subjective and potent it can become, and why reflection can be so hard to assess and teach. 
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By distinguishing the core components from the extrinsic elements, our model allows reflection 
to be informed by the extrinsic elements, without being bound to them. Reflection thus remains 
universally applicable and understandable independent of context. Reflection, in our model, can 
involve any discipline, any medium (e.g., portfolios, oral sessions), any timing (i.e., before/in/after 
action), and so forth. It can draw on affective content, as Boud et al. have suggested if 
appropriate,18 or can forgo it if not. By pinpointing its fundamental components, and by 
prescribing only those, our definition allows reflection to assume many different forms without 
diluting its meaning.  
Limitations of our process of defining reflection  
To achieve a manageable dataset for analysis, we first retrieved definitions reported by major 
authors, and extracted an author’s model only when no definition was obtained. Whereas every 
effort was made to ensure accurate representation, we acknowledge that the excerpts presented 
in Table I might be considered condensed or fragmentary. This is a telling example of the 
difficulties encountered when seeking to understand reflection. Additionally, inherent to any 
qualitative analysis, a risk of bias in interpretation exists. To lessen this possibility, results were 
discussed at each research stage, and any disagreements were outlined and resolved. While 
recognizing these limitations, we believe these shortcomings in retrieval or analysis have not 
significantly impacted our proposed definition of reflection, as the key defining features of 
authors are accounted for. Furthermore, whereas our definition is considered comprehensive, 
our model voluntarily allows for the unmentioned elements of other models to be integrated as 
“other” extrinsic elements, as shown in Figure 4. 
A few implications of our model 
Professional development and autonomy 
Schön viewed reflection as a primary way for practitioners to learn in practice.17 Of the various 
means of learning, reflection has earned a prominent place in the pedagogy of professional 
disciplines. We believe that the popularity of reflection is partly attributable to the autonomy it 
affords. Because professional practice per se entails the notion of autonomy, professionals should 
learn in ways that foster autonomy. By placing the self component at the center of the reflective 
process, our model of reflection clearly focuses on autonomous practice. And whereas our model 
prescribes five components of reflection, it allows substantial leeway in the content within these 
components. One’s reflection and the resultant learning can be as deeply personal and 
44 
 
autonomous as one’s practice. And because reflection is grounded in one’s unique conceptual 
frame, any operationalization of reflection must take into account its inherent subjectivity. 
Assessment and teaching  
Our model of reflection has implications for its assessment and teaching. First, because reflection 
comprises five components, it cannot be fully assessed in a monolithic, one-dimensional manner 
from non-reflective to reflective, as most scales do.30, 31, 47, 56 Our model allows a more in-depth 
understanding of reflection through separate understanding of each component and their 
interactions. For example, one might think in an attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative 
fashion without ever thinking about one’s underlying conceptual frame. Whereas a one-
dimensional assessment of reflection would not distinguish a functioning ACEI component from 
an absent CF component, a multi-dimensional scale would, and would therefore have the ability 
to inform the personalized teaching and development of reflection. 
Second, due to the multi-component nature of reflection, its assessment should not be simply 
dichotomized into “reflective” and “non/pre-reflective.”57-59 Whereas the most mature and 
powerful form of reflection involves all five components, this does not mean that any thinking 
short of that is unreflective. Instead, we prefer to think of reflection as a continuum, with many 
degrees of development for each component. Teaching the art of reflection means moving 
towards full reflection. 
Third, by clearly defining reflection irrespective of timing, our model can be used to assess and 
teach both reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action, unlike other models or applications of 
reflection such as reflective writing, which concerns mainly reflection after the action.  
Finally, because reflection is explicitly conceptualized as a process, without reference to any 
predetermined extrinsic outcome, we believe that our model will help prevent the error of 
teaching and assessing the outcome of an instance of reflection (what—the content—we want 
one to learn) rather than its process (how to learn). As Kolb has said of learning,42 reflection is a 
process, not an outcome. When assessing reflection, we should not measure the final destination 
of reflection or the distance traveled using it, but rather the reflective journey itself, as conveyed 




Through a systematic and unified analysis of the most cited definitions of reflection, we developed 
a new definition and model. Our operational definition includes five distinct core components 
(TA, ACEI, CF, VC, S), which distinguish reflection from other thinking processes. Our model of 
reflection supplements the core components with extrinsic elements that inform and refine 
instances of reflection. 
In light of the aforementioned strengths, benefits, and limitations, we propose that our 
conceptualization, rather than amplifying the problem of lack common understanding and 
applications of reflection, may serve as a current meta-definition and meta-model to provide a 
sound framework for understanding and operationalizing reflection.  
In Kurt Lewin’s thoughtful words, there is nothing as practical as a good theory. Ultimately, the 
usefulness and validity of our definition and model will depend on their capacity to inform 
practical applications. Although our understanding of reflection will certainly evolve with further 
research, we hope that the process we have here described brings us closer to developing more 
comprehensive learning, teaching and research about reflection. 
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In this section, we wish to explore and expand the discussion featured in the article. We start by 
examining other methodological limitations in our research process. Added explanations and 
appraisal of our definition and model follow. We then discuss some other theoretical and practical 
implications our conceptualization has. Finally, proposals of further avenues of research conclude 
the supplementary discussion. 
Methodological considerations and limitations 
Query and selection of articles 
As is reported in the Methods section, to obtain the raw data used in the thematic analysis, we 
needed to identify the definitions and models of reflection that drive our current understanding 
of it. To achieve this, we first reviewed all articles published on the subject of reflection in medical 
education between 2008 and 2012. Most of these papers reported on an application of reflection. 
From these papers (n=430), we sought to identify the definitions of reflection that these paper 
referred to in order to identify the most influential. Of the 430 articles, 72 provided a clear 
reference to one or multiple theorists (and their definitions) of reflection; the relative influence 
of each of the 74 identified theorist was quantified by the total number of citations they obtained 
(the 15 most influential were kept for our analysis). 
The query and selection process raises two significant issues. First is the short and arbitrary five-
year timeframe for the search, which could have omitted more recent (or older) papers with 
enlightening models of reflection that could have better informed our conceptual analysis. Second 
is the questionable assumption of quantifying influence solely by the number of citations. 
Citations do not always amount to sanctioning, and papers can be cited because of inadequacy or 
controversy. Also, it might be incorrect to assume that a more frequently cited models is a 
superior one.   
It is true that our systematic search might have missed papers with informative models and that 
our measure of influence has caveats. Nonetheless, we hold that these issues have not unduly 
biased our process. With regards to the short timeframe of the search, it is important to reiterate 
that the goal of the search was not to identify papers which presented models of reflection, but 
to identify—and quantify—references to models already described—and influential— in the 
literature. Extending the timeframe would probably not have changed the identified influential 
theorists and models. In addition, we wanted to create a model of reflection that would gain 
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widespread recognition by being based on the most important theories of reflection in use. It can 
be argued that the inclusion of novel but less consensual models of reflection in our analysis might 
have generated excessive complexity and deterred us from our objective. We accepted the 
possibility of leaving out more intricate models of reflection, gaining in consensus what is lost in 
granularity.  
Regarding the quantification of influence by number of citations, we contend that although 
imperfect, it remains the most pragmatic way of ordering the 74 theorists we identified to retain 
a manageable number (n=15) for our conceptual analysis. The validity of each citation was 
checked and all were citations to models and definitions of reflection that were used in the 
papers, not citations to their inadequacy. While it is true that the frequent citation of a model 
does not necessarily translate into its superiority, it does mirror its greater acceptance and 
adoption, both of which are good selection criteria for inclusion of a model in a thematic analysis 
towards a result that is also aimed at achieving acceptance and adoption. 
Ontological considerations 
To create our model of reflection, we exclusively analysed theories of reflection. In our research 
process, we did not have recourse to any empirical analysis of reflection. Despite a purely 
theoretical process having its benefits, the lack of inclusion of any empirical data also raises 
inevitable vulnerabilities, both of which will now be discussed. 
Benefits of a solely theoretical process 
We have stressed that the construct of reflection is currently conceptualized in multiple 
discrepant theoretical forms. All the more manifest is that reflection has been operationalized in 
a still greater number of discrepant forms in practice.31, 35 The existence of myriad applications of 
reflection pose a tremendous challenge for any attempts to summarize and unify their theoretical 
basis. Moreover, because it is impossible to ensure that all purportedly reflective applications 
refer to a shared theory of reflection, doing so with any sense of coherence might be impossible. 
It also needs to be emphasized that the primary goal of our study was to coin new definition and 
model of reflection which are de facto abstractions stemming from the concrete phenomena of 
reflection. Hence, even if there is a loss of information in excluding empirical particulars of 
reflection, this loss of information might in fact be valuable by pruning the superfluous while 
retaining—and thus extracting—the core meaning of reflection.  
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By including and analysing the conceptualizations of the 15 most influential theorists to create 
ours, we delegated to them the task of extracting the essence and definition of reflection from 
the experience and application of reflection. Although we could have carried out this translation 
from the practical to the theoretical ourselves, it would have been to the expense of the multiple 
perspectives afforded by inclusion of 15 theorists. Instead, by concentrating our efforts on 
unifying the multiple theoretical perspectives—and not creating one of our own—we obtained a 
much more diverse, rich, and robust analysis of reflection. We see further and more clearly by 
standing on the shoulder of giants than through our own dwarf eyes. 
Vulnerabilities of a solely theoretical process 
Our research process can be regarded as a qualitative meta-analysis: we systematically identify, 
analyse and integrate previous models to create a new “meta-model.” As is the case with all meta-
analysis, the quality of the end result will be tributary of the quality of the included studies. Had 
we included conceptualizations of reflection that were misconceived by their theorists (one first 
vulnerability), the resulting model would undeniably also be misconceived. Garbage in, garbage 
out. But arguing such a case would be almost untenable in light of the 15 authors that we have 
reported. To refute the conceptualizations put forth by Schön, Dewey, Boud et al., and the like 
would almost be tantamount to refute the construct of reflection itself. 
But ensuring the adequacy of the included models does not ensure that the process of analysing 
them is also adequate. The first issue related to analysis is the difficulty in extracting the definition 
and model from the works of the theorists which we have already discussed in the article. By 
definition abstract and synoptic, definitions and models that we analysed could be considered by 
some an incomplete or fragmentary appreciation of the exhaustive theorisation (second 
vulnerability).  The second issue related to analysis is that unlike bona fide meta-analyses—albeit 
themselves not immune to criticism—which manipulate quantitative data as in the biomedical 
field, ours involved qualitative data. As words and concepts cannot be manipulated as numbers 
and statistics are, there is an inherent risk that our synthesis of the identified models could be 
inadequate (and as a consequence, also our definition and model—third vulnerability). 
Another more fundamental cause is the unifying process itself (fourth vulnerability). It can be 
argued that true meaning can hardly be reducible to a simple sequence of words and that 
common words might have differing meaning in each author’s differing context. And 
consequently that even if Table II shows that our proposed unified definition elegantly 
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encompasses the definitions or models of 15 major theorists of reflection, it might not genuinely 
encompass their original meanings. As it is impossible to provide any indisputable proof for or 
against this argument of theoretical validity, what is more relevant is to determine if the unified 
definition has meaningfulness in its usage and application, that is, if it has validity in practice. 
The question of the validity in practice of our model of reflection 
To repeat the thoughtful words of Kurt Lewin which we quoted in the conclusion of our article, 
there is nothing as practical as a good theory.53 In other words, the definitive test of validity for 
our model of reflection is not its theoretical validity with regards to other models, but its capacity 
to comprehend, guide, and inform practice. To use our model of reflection (presented in Figure 
4) as a metaphor, what we need to establish is if our proposed underlying conceptual frame (CF) 
for reflection (i.e., the model of reflection we propose) is congruent and accurate with regards to 
the thoughts and actions (TA) of reflection (i.e. the phenomena of reflection). Continuing with this 
metaphor, our research process consisted in the analysis and synthesis—in an attentive, critical, 
exploratory, and iterative (ACEI) process—of fifteen conceptual frames of reflection (described by 
its 15 most theorists) to devise our own CF of reflection. Thus, what needs to be tested is if this 
newer CF is far removed from the actual TA of reflection or—hopefully—a better 
conceptualization of it. Figure 5 conceptualizes our research process through the lens of the TA, 
CF, and ACEI core components, and identifies diagrammatically the potential vulnerabilities that 
have been discussed.  




ACEI: attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative | CF: underlying conceptual frame |  
CFT: underlying conceptual frame of theorists | CFE: underlying conceptual frame as extracted | 
TA: thoughts and actions | the orange circles identify vulnerabilities in research process 
 
The more habitual process of delineating and validating the construct of reflection involves 
starting with the phenomena (TA) of reflection to construct a model (CF) and then test or validate 
it empirically (TA), usually in a different context. This is shown in Figure 5 by the blue dotted and 
slightly curved arrow which represents hypothetical testing of the 15th identified model of 
reflection.  
Our process started with 15 models of reflection and obtained one resulting model which now 
needs to be tested empirically for validity. This is represented in Figure 5 as the link between the 
CFpropsed and the TAphenomena of reflection. Anticipating Lewin, Dewey recognized the unbreakable 
relationship between theory and practice, which he described in a more general manner as the 
link between “concrete and abstract thinking.” To him, abstract thinking—the “theoretical”—
“represents an end, not the end.”37 Because models of reflection are abstractions from the 
phenomena of reflection, they cannot be completely disjointed from it without losing all meaning. 
Thus, measuring the adequacy of our model must be done in practice, in the particulars, 
empirically. Ultimately, the value and validity of our model will be judged by its capacity to 
represent practice, to be translated into it, i.e., to be operationalized. 
Methodological considerations for operationalization 
We wish to address one last methodological consideration pertaining to the eventual 
operationalization and testing of our model. This is the critical and formidable challenge posed by 
the operationalization of any model. Just as reflection has already been operationalized by many 
in many diverging ways (sometimes while using a common theoretical model), there is a lurking 
risk of incorrectly operationalizing—and faulting—a perfectly valid model. As such, precautions 
need to be taken into account when pursuing the translation from theory to practice. For 
example, we agree with Wass and Anderson that the process of reflection should not be 
ritualized;67 for reflection to fully unfold, it should not be improperly constrained, and reflectors 
should be allowed considerable leeway. Because our model does report on five essential 
components for reflection, one might be tempted to operationalize reflection by imposing a 
sequence or specific steps for each component, which would erroneously reflect our model and 
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the reality of reflection. But should every application stemming from our model of reflection 
prove unsuccessful, we would clearly need to be dispute it. If our model repeatedly fails the test 
of operationalization, it conclusively fails the test of usefulness in practice—and therefore—also 
the test of theoretical and practical validity. With the goal of operationalizing our model, we 
discuss a few ideas regarding practical applications and testing of our model of reflection in the 
last section on Further avenues of research.  
Further exploration of the model 
To complement the results and discussion sections of the article, we now turn to further 
exploration of our proposed model. We wish to provide a more explicit explanation of the model 
firstly by appraising and detailing the core components, their essential connections and 
interactivity; secondly, we address the extrinsic elements and their role in the model. 
Core components 
The first of five key criteria directing our research process was to coin a definition of reflection 
that would be structure-driven. We thus outlined a definition comprising five core components 
required in reflection. To better grasp their individual role in reflection, we isolate and discuss 
each before reuniting them to see how they function together to create reflection. 
The thoughts and actions component (TA) 
The results section of the article has already reported that reflection is foremost a thinking process 
and that all thinking processes must involve a content and a process. Indeed, when one is thinking, 
one mentally represents some form of content which is processed. It is impossible to think about 
nothing (except about the concept of nothing, itself a type of content). The intentionality of 
thought was already recognized by the Scholastics in the Middle Ages and was restated by 
psychologist Franz Brentano who noted that “every mental phenomenon includes something as 
object within itself.”68 It is also impossible think about a content (the object of the mental 
phenomenon) without performing some form of mental operation on that content, be it to look 
at it, analyze it, scrutinize it, or modify it. It is this content, object, or subject of thinking that we 
have chosen to label the thoughts and actions component. The TA component is meant to be 
encompassing of all content that one might be present in one’s thinking as Figure 6 shows. 
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Figure 6. Structure of all thinking processes 
 
Another important point is that TA is usually only conceptualized as the starting content—the 
substrate—that is fed in the process of reflection (which involves the four other components of 
reflection that characterize this reflective process). Yet once the content of the TA component is 
processed reflectively, it still remains “content” (albeit a different “processed” content) of the 
reflective process. Thoughts that have been thought about are still thoughts. Thus, this processed 
content can—and eventually should—be part of the (newer) content that is reflected upon: 
processed TA is also to be part of the TA component. A corollary is that the starting content of 
reflection is to be differentiated from the content of reflection once the process of reflection has 
started to unfold; this can be symbolized by TAs for starting/substrate TA and TAp for processed 
TA. Figure 7 presents the relationship between, TAS, the process of reflection, and TAP. It also 
shows how processed TA is iteratively reflected upon to produce further processed TA. 
Figure 7. TAS, process of reflection, and TAP 
 
If TA is meant to represent the object or content of reflection, why not choose to label it a less 
restrictive way, for example, simply as the “content” of reflection? The most relevant reason is 
that we wanted to render explicit the relation between thoughts and actions, the first informing 
and influencing the latter. Reflection aims to manipulate thoughts to improve on thoughts and 
also on actions, as represented by the bidirectional arrow in Figure 4 and 6.  
Obviously, when one thinks about actions, one is manipulating thoughts, not actions. But since 
the TA component will more predominantly be viewed as the substrate/starting TA that emerges 
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from experience, it is not a stretch to view actions as a core part of the content/TA component of 
reflection. Moreover, Schön would argue (though not all theorists would agree) that in reflection-
in-action, thoughts and actions are not as distinct as is usually considered the case.26 
The last observation concerning the TA component is related to the discriminative ability of our 
definition, the third criteria directing our research process. We identified the core components as 
transformative of thinking processes, making them inherently reflective. Although we did include 
the TA component as a core component because it is indispensable—and thus constitutive—to 
any reflection thinking process, it is evidently also present in all thinking process. Even if the 
presence of a TA component is mandatory in reflection, it is presence is not distinctive or 
discriminant of reflection. All thinking process involves content and no specific starting content 
would make thinking about it inherently reflective. As follows, the TA component is unlike the 
four other core components which are both mandatory and discriminant of full reflection. 
The attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative component (ACEI) 
The ACEI component is unique among the five core component in that it only characterizes the 
process of reflective thinking, not its content. We mentioned in the article that in order to reflect 
one must think about TA in an attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative fashion. For reflective 
thinking to occur, the process of thinking must be qualitatively different from habitual thinking. 
We identified the qualifiers of attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative as the better 
approximation of the qualities of the process of reflection that theorists have reported. 
Attentive thinking 
When thinking reflectively, one thinks in an attentive, “deliberate,” and “careful” way with 
“awareness” of the thinking that is unfolding. Attentive thinking allows for greater insight in one’s 
thinking processes, its strengths and flaws. Because thinking, in particular routine thinking, “is 
peculiarly exposed to error” and “is liable to be influenced by almost any number of unseen and 
unconsidered causes” as Dewey notes,37 reflective thinking must be attentive to foster the 
detection of these errors and the correction of their causes. 
Critical thinking 
In addition to being attentive, reflective thinking must also be critical. This is certainly due to the 
developmental intertwining of the construct of reflection and critical thinking.69 The definitions 
of Schön,26 Mezirow,70 Atkins and Murphy,13, and Mann et al.11 explicitly mention the need for 
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reflection to be critical in order to “maintain a state of doubt and to carry on a systematic and 
protracted inquiry”37 that to Dewey are the essentials of thinking. It is only when reflection is 
critical that it can empower the emancipation function that Habermas44—and Mezirow70 in his 
footsteps—has described. 
Exploratory thinking 
Thinking that is attentive and critical is clearly more conducive to being reflective. But theorists 
such as Boyd and Fales71 and Boud et al.28 have also described the process of reflective thinking 
as involving a form of exploration. Mann also remarks that reflection helps achieve a “deeper 
meaning and understanding.” The exploratory subcomponent of the ACEI component is related 
to the view on change (VC) component: for reflection to have a view on change, it must be 
incorporate a function of development and expansion of the content that is reflected upon. When 
reflecting, one must analyse the TA component in a way that increases both the breadth and 
depth of thinking. 
Iterative thinking 
“Iterative” is the final qualifier of the process of reflective thinking. The etymology of the word 
reflection bears this idea of iteration: in Latin re- has the general meaning of “back” or “again.”5 
Dewey’s definition uses the word “persistent” to characterize reflection, while the models of 
Korthagen72 and Jay and Johnson73 portray the process of reflection as a cycle. In reflective 
thinking, the result of the process of reflection (what we have labelled as TAP) upon the starting 
content (TAS) should be reprocessed, either following further cognitive analysis or testing in 
practice. The latter case mirrors the “trial” described by Korthagen72 or Schön’s 
“experimentation.”26 Reflection is thus a loop that involves progressively richer material and 
analysis. The iterative nature of reflection and its association with the VC component is shown in 
Figure 4 by the loop surrounding the VC component. Figure 7 presented a simpler view of the 
iterative nature of reflection as the loop between the global process of reflection and TAP. Figure 
8 expands Figure 7 to include all four subcomponents of the process of reflection in relation to 




Figure 8. Reflective thinking and the attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative 
subcomponents 
 
The underlying conceptual frame component (CF) 
Among the five core components, the CF component is probably the most challenging to 
understand and include in the reflective process. This might explain why it has been sometimes 
omitted in the theory of reflection and often is in its practice. But to most theorists, what we have 
identified as the underlying conceptual frame component is absolutely central to reflection. Being 
central, we will further examine it, firstly by clarifying its nature and secondly by exploring its 
function and usefulness in reflection.  
The nature of the CF component 
We have previously described CF as revealing “why we perceive, think, feel or act as we do.”70 
The CF component is indeed inseparable from the TA component: by definition it is the 
“assumptional structures”26 or “belief structures”74 that underlie our thoughts and actions; in 
other words the “why” that underlies our current understanding of things. Reflection calls for this 
questioning of the frame of our thoughts rather than the thoughts themselves. In doing so, there 
is an implicit acceptance of (i) the existence of a frame or structure—conscious or not—that 
underlies and is explicative of any form of thoughts and actions, and (ii) that this frame or 
structure is not systematically present in all thinking. Schön posits this by establishing the 
existence of knowing-in-action which differs from the totality of knowledge that one possesses, 
and tacit knowledge which one cannot fully account for, even on demand.26, 52 Dewey also accepts 
this premise by defining reflection as involving the consideration of “knowledge in the light of the 
grounds that support it.”37 
In other fields, a similar form of what we have labelled the CF component can be found under 
different denominations as schemata69 or scripts.75 The CF component represents the answer to 
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“why does one do what one is doing?” and “why does one think what one is thinking?” Put 
otherwise, it is one’s lens on the world or on a situation in it, one’s cognitive structure comprising 
a precise set of knowledge, memories, exemplars, experiences, abstractions, etc. that are 
mobilized in order to organize and find meaning in any specific circumstance.  
The function and usefulness of the CF component 
The CF component is fundamental in reflection for three reasons. The first is its explicative and 
transformative power for the TA component. Because the CF component are what underlies our 
TA, including it in the reflective process fosters more accurate reflection on TA by also requiring 
reflection on how we came to think and act the way that we did. Dewey has observed that thinking 
is prone to errors of “past experiences, received dogmas, the stirring of self-interest, the arousing 
of passion […]”37 which can be more readily detected when one thinks about the CF and not only 
the TA. To paraphrase Schön, it is only when one thinks about the CF that one can “frame and 
reframe” a situation, problem, or understanding to gather a new and more constructive 
perspective for them. The quote often attributed to Einstein that "no problem can be solved from 
the same level of consciousness that created it"76 is in the same vein. It is only when one critically 
break the shackles bounding one’s thinking that true emancipation arises. 
The second function and usefulness of the CF component in reflection derives from its relation 
with the TA component. According to Schön, “our descriptions of knowing-in-action [the CF of our 
TA] are always constructions.” Being constructions, this raises the question of the adequacy of 
these constructions with regards to TA. In the best of reflections, CF is highly explicative and 
encompassing of TA. A great deal of one’s reflective ability lies in the ability of mobilizing the 
accurate CF for the TA at hand. Although it is illusory to believe in practice that the CF can 
consistently explicate the full of TA, a CF that is more explicative of what has occurred or more 
predictive of what is to occur is clearly superior. As Dewey noted, “it is a familiar and significant 
saying that a problem well put is half-solved.”77 By singling out the CF from the TA—what was 
described in the article as thinking aimed at “one’s understanding of the problem […] rather than 
aimed simply at trying to solve it”—,36 it is possible to scrutinize it to identify its missing and 
erroneous elements. In brief, the usefulness of the CF component lies not only in its function as 
explicative of the TA, but as an object (i.e., a content) of the reflective process itself which should 
be looked at in a ACEI manner in itself and in relation with TA. 
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The third reason why the CF component is essential stems from its more abstract nature as 
compared to the more concrete TA. As CF are the cognitive constructions underlying TA, they will 
usually—though not always—be more conceptual than the thoughts and actions they gave rise 
to; reflective thinking extracts the more generic features out of the particulars of experience in 
order to examine the CF behind them. Because of its more abstract nature, CF can empower faster 
and richer expansion of one’s reflection than if it was solely concerned with the more concrete 
TA. To use the example featured in Table III, if Nicolas thinks about the underlying reasons for his 
issues at work, he would much improve his reflection over thinking only about his issues at work. 
In addition to fostering better reflection, the CF component, by stimulating one’s reflection to be 
more abstract, also allows the results of reflection to be applicable in more numerous subsequent 
situations. If one goal of reflection, as Sandars describes, is that “future encounters […] are 
informed from previous encounters,”10 the CF component is crucial in ensuring that the cognitive 
outcome of a reflection is not so particular and specific that it prevents it from having utility in 
any other context. Reflection that seeks to clarify and unravel broad rules or principles is more 
useful than reflection which deals only with individual occurrences or instances. 
The view on change component (VC) 
We have reported that the VC component is related to the exploratory subcomponent of the ACEI 
component. Although linked with exploration, the VC component is more explicit in requiring a 
consideration of change to be included in reflection. Whereas exploration of thinking commands 
broadening of the reflective thinking process (which is a form of change), the view on change 
component also commands that this broadening include testing of this envisioned broadening by 
(re)viewing it. Not all authors are explicit in detailing the way this testing should happen. Some, 
such as Korthagen, specifically describe a step of “trial” in reflection that is to occur in practice (in 
action);72 others, Dewey for example, rather view this component as a cognitive step in reflection 
by analysis of “the further conclusion to with it tends”;37 yet others see this testing as rooted in 
both thought and action, as Schön when he speaks of reflection-in-action as “on-the-spot 
experiment” unfolding in an “action-present.”49 
Regardless of the precise means of testing, that a form of testing must be present in reflection 
needs to be stressed. This is essential in ensuring that the reflective process does not prove sterile 
and that is does provide meaningful change pertaining to thoughts, actions, or both. Also common 
to all views on the VC component is that it involves testing that translates abstract theorisation in 
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more concrete contexts. We have mentioned that reflection, in particular by virtue of its CF 
component, fosters thinking that is removed from the particular; in viewing the validity of the 
change created by reflective thinking, the envisioned change must be reintroduced into practice 
(or more concrete thinking) to verify if it can stand up to reality. This interplay between the 
abstract and the concrete in reflection mirrors Lewin53 and Kolb27 cycles of experiential learning. 
The self component (S) 
The results section of the article introduced the notion that the self component pertains to the 
content to be processed (as part of TA) and to the process of reflection itself, and that the full 
reflective process should include the self component in both ways. Further examining this 
component, we will expand this key notion and expose a few of its consequences. 
Firstly, it is no surprise that a component of self must be included in any form of thinking. As 
Dewey mentions, to think for oneself is a truism as one can evidently not think in lieu of someone 
else. Thinking always stems from oneself; in the process of reflective thinking, the self is the agent 
of thinking. And because reflective thinking calls for the other three process-related components 
(ACEI, CF, VC), this means that all three also stem from oneself. When reflecting, one mobilizes 
one’s ability to think in an attentive, critical, exploratory, and iterative way, with one’s underlying 
conceptual frames, and one’s own capacity for viewing and testing change. 
Secondly, in reflection it is especially interesting that the self is not only the agent of thinking, but 
also its subject/object (i.e., the content of reflection). Obviously, one’s content of reflection can 
be about one’s TA. But it can also be about one’s ACEI ability in thinking, one’s CF, and one’s 
capacity for VC. The self component is thus deeply embedded in reflection as it interrelates with 
the content, the process, and all other components of reflection. Moreover, the self is present 
before, during, and after the reflective thinking process.  
Thirdly, compounding the key role of the self component in reflection is the reciprocity it allows 
between the content and process of reflection, and, as a result, the stronger connectedness and 
sense of self it develops. By cultivating both the self as subject and the self as agent in the long 
run, reflection improves both our knowledge of self and our process of improving our knowledge 
of self, which together improves our capacity for actions within and without ourselves. The central 
location of the self component in our model of reflection in Figure 4 serves to demonstrate its 
core and commanding importance.  
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Figure 9 summarizes this section by showing all core components and how they relate to the 
content and the process of reflection.  
Figure 9. The five core components of reflection in relation to content, process, TAS, and TAP 
 
Connections and interactions between the core components 
After examining the core components individually, we now focus on their interactions to fully 
explore our proposed model of reflection. Table III gave a first example of how these components 
can interact to lead to full reflection. Figures 4 and 9 presented the core components and their 
potential interrelations which we now describe in greater detail.  
Reflection as connectedness of core components 
A recurring error in the conceptualization of reflection is to concentrate mostly on the presence 
of core components at the expense of the relationship between them.  Reflection is first and 
foremost a thinking process and it is thus powered not by the mere presence of thinking content 
but by the processing interactions with it. In more diagrammatic words, the arrows and brackets 
in Figures 4 and 9 are as important in reflection as the boxes.  
The TA-CF relationship has already been discussed in the article and in the supplementary 
discussion. Suffice to reiterate that it is presumably the most central interaction in the reflective 
process. Starting with the TA, reflection asks for one to render explicit and conscious its CF and 
further to examine the relevance and adequacy of their relation. More developed reflection 
would also include an ACEI examination of the core TA-CF relation; addition of the VC and S 
components in the process would develop it even more. 
The relationship between TA and S is another example worth discussing. On one level, it entails 
examining what our TA tells us about our self. Reciprocally, it questions how our view of self can 
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explain our TA. On a different level, the TA-S interaction might also mean investigating the 
adequacy of our TA in fulfilling the view, goals, or objectives of the self. Thus, it can serve to 
contemplate if “what you think, what you say, and what you do are in harmony” which is a vision 
of happiness that some have attributed to Gandhi.78 
A theoretical and practical reason for considering the interactions of the five core components, is 
to allow for better reconciliation with certain features of reflection that appear missing in our 
conceptualization. For example, Wald has reported that the “awareness of self” was a critical, but 
absent, element in our model.79 Yet, the idea of awareness of self is very much present: by 
combining the attentive subcomponent of ACEI with the S component, one becomes attentive—
that is aware—to oneself. By avoiding too precise wording and by leaving the possibility of 
combining the core components, our goal was to create the most nimble and adaptable definition 
and model. Because our thematic analysis split the concept of awareness of self (present in Atkins 
and Murphy’s13 definition included in our analysis) into ACEI + S, it allows for an understanding 
reflection that is indeed aware of self, but also critical of self, exploratory of self, and in an iterative 
fashion. And through interactions with the other components, this awareness of self can be 
augmented with the inclusion of a view on change and of the underlying conceptual frame. 
Reflection as the development of the core components and their connectedness 
Many more relations between core components can be described. But for reasons of concision, 
we prefer above all to reinforce that the improvement of the reflective process is pursued by both 
developing the core components and their connectedness, not one in isolation from the other. 
Fully developed reflection entails the presence of (i) all five components, (ii) their growth, and (iii) 
the growth of their connections. It is in the interactivity of components that lies the multiplicative 
effect of reflection as exemplified in Table III. 
Because of the great number of interrelations between its components, as Figure 4 shows, 
reflection cannot be adequately conceptualized as linear or sequence-based process. Reflection 
does not need to follow a specific series of steps to unfold; contrariwise, individual occurrences 
of reflection can be—and probably are—as unique as the individuals in which they take place. The 
core components and the relations between them must be developed, but clearly not in a 
predetermined process or ritualized method. 
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Extrinsic elements  
We have reported that the extrinsic elements are those that characterize the reflective thinking 
process without making them inherently reflective. The article presented the trigger, the context, 
and an overview of other extrinsic elements. In this added section, we further elaborate on the 
triggers and the emotional element of reflection. 
The triggers of reflection: triggering content and triggering agent 
Most theorists speak of a trigger of reflection; Moon indicates that the “mental processing” of 
reflection emerges from “relatively complex or unstructured ideas,”33 whereas Boyd and Fales say 
that it is “triggered by an experience.”71 For the majority of authors, the trigger is understood as 
the content (the starting/substrate TA component, or TAS) that initiates the reflective process. It 
is usually content that is uncertain, hazy, or murky at the outset and needs clarification, what 
Atkins and Murphy refer to as “uncomfortable feelings and thoughts.”13 The article has already 
noted the distinction to be made between the content that triggers (i.e., the triggering content) 
reflection and the content that is fed into the reflective process. But as reflection is both 
characterized by its content as well as its process, another distinction to be made is the one 
between the triggering content and the triggering agent of reflection. Content cannot in itself 
trigger the process of reflection; there needs to be an agent to set it into motion. Frequently the 
triggering agent of reflection will be the one reflecting. Nonetheless, it can be an outside 
authority, as when learners are asked by their educators to be or become reflective. There is 
presumably an association between the extent of uncertainty and discomfort of the triggering 
content and its tendency for reflection to be self-triggered: a specific situation that is especially 
surprising will more readily compel one to start reflecting on one’s own. The same could be 
envisioned for an anxious individual who would more easily and frequently set off reflective 
processes than one who is complacent. 
That there exists both a triggering agent and a triggering content in reflection, and that the same 
content and agent might—or might not—trigger reflection, opens up the notion of propensity for 
reflection. A high propensity to reflect is conceptualized as a high tendency for self-triggering of 
reflection and for reflection to be prompted by less surprising, uncertain, or murky content. Figure 
10 shows how the construct of propensity in reflection fit in relation to the content and process 
of reflection. Another construct unveiled by the description of the triggering content of reflection 
is the fidelity of reflection. It is discussed in the later section Practical considerations: implications 
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for assessing and teaching reflection, along with potential implications for the propensity for 
reflection construct. 
 
Figure 10. Triggering agent and triggering content in relation to reflective thinking 
 
The emotional element of reflection 
We have brushed on the emotional element of reflection in the article. We noted its likely 
presence in the TA component as content of reflection, and its classification with the extrinsic 
elements of reflection. Excluding the emotional dimension of reflection from its constitutional 
ones (i.e., the five core components) is debatable. For Boud et al. and others,13, 79 emotions have 
a crucial function in reflection: by “attending to feelings,” positive ones can remove obstructing 
one in order to better appraise the content of reflection.28 Emotions can act as both a barrier and 
a facilitator for reflection. It is clear that emotions do influence reflection. 
We ultimately decided to classify the emotional dimension as an extrinsic element of reflection 
because although often present and often influencing reflection it is not mandatory for it. Full 
reflection at its essence can occur without recourse to feelings and emotions. This is not to say 
that full reflection should occur without recourse to emotions, above all in circumstances where 
it does impact the content and the process of reflection. But it does amount to saying that there 
are many circumstances where, even without recourse to emotions, one’s reflection can still be 
wholly complete and deeply developed. 
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Implications for the knowledge and application of reflection 
After discussions concerning the methodological considerations and exploration of our proposed 
model, we attend to its implications for the knowledge and application of reflection. We address 
theoretical considerations, first by comparing of our model of reflection with that of others. We 
then contrast of our construct of reflection with other cognitive theoretical and practical 
constructs (e.g., metacognition and script concordance). We conclude this section by addressing 
practical considerations related to the application and operationalization of reflection. 
Theoretical considerations: the knowledge of reflection 
Our model compared to other models of reflection 
The argument for our model’s theoretical capacity to unify the most influential conceptualizations 
of reflection and propose one that is both encompassing and current has already been reported 
in Table II. Supplementing its ability to integrate the previous models, our model can also be used 
to better identify areas of discrepancies between them. For example, not all theorists definitively 
refer to the presence of the CF component (i.e., Boud et al.,28 Mann et al.,11 Korthagen58). 
Likewise, the S component appears to be absent in Dewey’s, Schön’s, or Hatton and Smith’s 
definitions. The ability to assess how each theorization differs is particularly useful to diagnose 
why and how specific applications stemming from them differ in turn. This might explain a great 
deal of the difficulty of providing empirical proof of its practical effectiveness as reflection has 
been theorized and applied—perhaps unknowingly—in divergent ways. 
Implications of our model of reflection with regards to other akin theoretical constructs 
Because of the complex nature of reflection, there is confusion surrounding (i) the multiple 
conceptualizations of reflection and (ii) the construct of reflection with regards to other akin 
theoretical constructs (e.g., critical thinking,80 dual-process theory,81 metacognition,82 and 
mindfulness83, 84). In addition to aiding in untangling the multiple views of reflection, our proposed 
model can also be used to contrast how reflection resembles and differs from these closely related 
constructs. The goal of the following comparison is not necessarily to be exhaustive nor to provide 
a complete analysis. Rather, we aim to explore the distinctness of reflection by discussing 
similarities and differences in order to clarify the nature of reflection itself. 
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Critical thinking (CT) 
The development of the construct of reflection is partly tributary to that of critical thinking. 
Sharing common original theorists with reflection, such as Dewey and Habermas, critical thinking 
is described by Facione et al. to be:  
“purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, 
analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, 
conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations 
upon which that judgment is based. CT is essential as a tool of inquiry. As 
such, CT is a liberating force in education and a powerful resource in one's 
personal and civic life. While not synonymous with good thinking, CT is a 
pervasive and self-rectifying human phenomenon.”80 
Contrasting this definition with the one we propose for reflection shows an undeniable 
relationship bearing more commonalities than differences. As for reflection, CT is a form of 
expanded thinking, and both differ from generic good thinking. The further characteristics of CT 
that distinguish it from good thinking are quite similar to the core components of reflection: all 
five can be accounted for in some form.  
Nonetheless CT and reflection are not synonymous. As the definition shows, CT pertains in 
particular to thinking focused on judgment—the cognitive processing per se; conversely, 
reflection is first concerned with thinking focused on TA (and eventually on one’s CF behind them, 
a VC, and the relevance of the self). Reflective thinking does entail judging and thinking critically 
(in an ACEI way, with CF), but the critical thinking in reflection is more a means than an end. 
Whereas CT concentrates mostly on the process of thinking, reflection concentrates on its process 
and content. There is also another slight difference in emphasis the role of the self component. 
CT considers the self as essentially the agent of analytical thinking having the agency to enhance 
one’s thinking; in reflection, the self must be considered both the agent and content (in Schön’s 
words the dual “agent/experient”)26 of thinking. Still, notwithstanding minor hair-splitting 
divergences, CT and reflection are very much alike. The literature on one could probably much 




In delineating reflection, Dewey aimed to better characterize diverse forms of thinking, reflective 
thinking being one of them. A well accepted and more recent characterization of cognitive 
processes is the dual-process theory which partitions them into intuitive (system 1) and reflective 
(system 2) processes.81 System 1 proposes intuitive judgments while system 2 is the more 
analytical and reasoned processes that monitor to “endorse, correct, or override” the judgments 
of system 1 towards the final cognitive judgment.85 The most interesting commonality between 
dual-process theory and reflection is the recognition of a tacit dimension in thinking. There is a 
correspondence between the effortless, opaque, automatic, and rapid processes of system 1 and 
the usual TA component; between the effortful, controlled, and self-aware processes of system 2 
and the ACEI/CF components of reflection. But because dual-process theory—unlike reflection 
which attends to thoughts, actions and their transformation—is purely anchored in cognition, the 
VC and S components are lacking in presence and in relevance. The purpose of reflection being 
more far-ranging and encompassing than that of dual-process theory, reflection explicitly calls for 
a cognitive process directed at change, as well as a much greater role for the self in this process. 
Metacognition 
Reflection and metacognition are related constructs,86 and some authors have described 
reflection as a “metacognitive process”.10 Metacognition is commonly defined as “cognition about 
cognition” or “knowledge about knowledge.”82 As was the case with critical thinking and dual-
process theory, metacognition resembles reflection being a specific form of thinking. More 
specifically, reflection does relate to a form of metacognition since it is indeed concerned with 
thinking about TA, CF, VC, and S. But our model of reflection also shows how reflection is different 
from general metacognition. 
Firstly, one cannot simple think about thinking in any fashion in reflection. Reflective thinking 
must involve all five TA, ACEI, CF, VC and S components which are not necessarily present in all 
metacognition, some forms of which can omit critical thinking, conceptual frames, or a view on 
change for example. Thus, reflection is not only a more precise form of thinking, it is also a more 
precise form of thinking about thinking, i.e., of metacognition.87  
Moreover, there is a fine but important nuance in the nature of the thinking about thinking that 
metacognition requires. According to Flavell, metacognitive experiences are “any conscious 
cognitive or affective experiences that accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise.”82 
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Two distinctions must be made with reflection: first is that even if fully developed reflective 
thinking implies consciousness of this thinking, forms of reflection can occur without full 
conscious grasp of the “intellectual enterprise” at hand. One can reflect by thinking about TA, CF, 
VC, about self, in an ACEI without mandatorily attending to its conscious unfolding, although one’s 
reflection will certainly be enhanced by being fully metacognitive. The second distinction is that 
metacognition is cognition about the process of thinking (i.e., the “intellectual enterprise”) 
whereas reflection is cognition that can involves both of the process and the content of thinking. 
Metacognitive knowledge “consists primarily of knowledge or beliefs about what factors or 
variables act and interact in what ways to affect the course and outcome of cognitive 
enterprises.”82 To draw a parallel with the core components of reflection, metacognition entails 
thinking most particularly about the ACEI thinking component—its process-related component—
, when reflection is also thinking about all other four components—its content and process-
related components. 
Mindfulness and mindful practice 
As is reported in the article, many authors relate reflection to mindfulness.83, 88 Mindfulness and 
the mindful practitioner are described by Epstein as: 
“a discipline and an attitude of mind. It requires critical informed curiosity 
and courage to see the world as it is rather than how one would have it be. 
Mindful practitioners tolerate making conscious their previously unconscious 
actions and errors.”83 
There are obviously many historical, epistemological, and teleological differences between 
reflection and mindfulness. Not delving into all of them, we wish to discuss two major points. 
Firstly, at its essence, mindfulness calls for greater consciousness and attending to experience. It 
is thus connected to and complements the attentive subcomponent of the ACEI component. 
“When one is mindful, one lives in the present and pays attention.”88 It is also linked with the 
triggering of reflection: as the mindful practitioner “is present in everyday experience, in all of its 
manifestations, including actions, thoughts, sensations, images, and interpretations, and 
emotions,” and makes “conscious their previously unconscious actions and errors,” 83 reflection 
is more readily triggered.  
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Secondly, a major difference between mindfulness and reflection is the non-conceptual essence 
of mindfulness which has its roots in Zen Buddhism.88, 89 By leading “the mind back from theories, 
attitudes and abstractions […] to the situation of experience itself,”90 it is to be distinguished from 
reflection which eventually requires thinking encompassing theories, abstractions, and a view on 
transforming them as the CF and VC component embody. Although, mindfulness and mindful 
practice appear to be powerful adjuncts to the process of reflecting, especially to the ACEI 
component, they are not equivalent to it. 
Implications of our model of reflection with regards to two practical concepts 
To add to implications of our model with professional development and autonomy that were 
discussed in the article, we briefly touch on potential relations between reflection and two others 
practical concepts in medical education: problem-based learning91 and the script concordance 
approach.92 
Problem-based learning (PBL) 
Although iterations of problem-based learning differs in various schools, four processes underlie 
PBL according to Dolmans et al.,93 i.e., constructive, self-directed, collaborative, and contextual 
processes. Albanese reports that the McMaster Philosophy, where PBL was created, has “self-
directed learning, PBL, and small group tutorial learning” as its three key features.94 Using our 
model of reflection as a comparison point, we can hypothesize that PBL might be more conducive 
to reflection than other learning methods, such as the more classical lecture-based learning. 
There are many commonalities between the core components of reflection and the processes and 
key features of PBL. The constructive and contextual processes of PBL echo the CF component, 
while the self-direction is evidently linked with the S component. The collaborative small group 
learning encourages the mobilization and ACEI analysis of one’s TA and CF. Furthermore, when 
resolving a PBL scenario the constructive process fosters a collaborative and ACEI thinking that is 
aimed at change (VC). 
Script concordance approach (SCA) 
Just as PBL can be theorized as a more reflective learning method, the script concordance 
approach might be considered a more reflective assessment modality. The SCA is “designed to 
probe whether the organization of clinical knowledge […] allows adequate clinical decisions.”92 By 
intending “to assess the meaningfulness of the links among items, rather than assessing items in 
isolation,” the SCA explicitly examines the CF component in decision-making. This contrasts with 
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multiple-choice or key-feature questions which only evaluate the end-decision itself (akin to the 
TA component). Also, by providing answers of the panel of experts which can be discrepant from 
those of the examinees, the SCA fosters a more ACEI analysis of the examinees’ TA and CF 
components; not only is the erroneous decision analyzed, but also the cognitive content that led 
to it. Finally, because SCA usually features authentic—thus uncertain and equivocal—clinical cases 
that call for interpretation of data in making decisions, these might further enhance the triggering 
and fostering of reflection than more straightforward cases. 
Practical considerations: implications for assessing and teaching reflection  
To supplement the Assessment and teaching section of the article, we now further discuss 
implications of our model on the application of reflection when evaluating and fostering it.  
The primary goal of our thematic analysis and synthesis was to provide a model of reflection 
better suited for its operationalization. We proposed that reflection could be more adequately 
translated into assessment and teaching by being conceptualized in a structure-driven and not 
outcome-driven model, and in a discriminative way. 
Benefits of structure-driven reflection 
Our model comprises five core components and their interrelations that together constitute what 
reflection is. This renders completely explicit what is required for reflection to fully develop. One’s 
reflection can thereby be examined for the presence or absence of each component. The 
components that are present can in turn be examined individually to expand them further. By 
allowing for identification and remediation of inadequately developed or missing component (or 
components) in reflection, our structure-driven model is more informative and easily 
operationalized than other conceptualizations that do not provide such a structure.  
In addition to the core components themselves, their aforementioned connectedness also has 
repercussions in the operationalization of reflection. When assessing or teaching reflection, it 
must be stressed that the depth and quality of reflection will also be determined by the 
interrelations between components. The most significant interrelation being between TA and CF, 
it must be thoroughly scrutinized and developed in reflection. Does my understanding accurately 
explain my thoughts and actions? Likewise, whereas ACEI thinking about TA will be more common 
than about CF, reflection must entail close inspection of CF along with the other components. One 
will perhaps examine the self and its relation with one’s TA, but in reflecting one should also aim 
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to change (VC) not only one’s TA but also oneself. These interactions are fundamental to 
reflection. Although far from easy, they must be analyzed and fostered. 
Benefits of reflection that is not outcome-driven 
Reflection is a process, not an outcome. A point should however be made: our model—as any—
does call for an outcome, but this outcome is a process (that of thinking in an ACEI, about TA, CF, 
and S, with a view at change) not a content. Defining by outcome becomes problematic is when 
this outcome is content-based. Reflection is at its essence a thinking process and setting its 
outcome as a specific content nullifies the possibility of further thinking once this specific content 
has been thought about, because content is perforce state-like and fixed. Contrariwise, even if its 
outcome is defined as a specific process—with a specific structure—, reflection and the thinking 
it involves can be pursued indefinitely, because process entails motion, action, and the idea of a 
progress and course in time. Our model delineates how the process of reflective thinking is distinct 
from other processes, without any defining an outcome-content. 
It is capital that both the understanding and the operationalization of reflection take into account 
this distinction between the outcome-content of reflection and its process (or outcome-process). 
In assessing and teaching reflection, the former cannot be substituted for the latter; at most it 
might be a proxy. It would senseless to state higher levels of reflection for experts compared to 
novices on the sole basis of greater content-expertise, as this greater expertise was probably 
antecedent to reflection. But this is what happens when assessment of content is substituted for 
assessment of process.  Besides, when facing expert material, the novice will hardly be able to be 
reflective; conversely, the same can be said for the expert faced with novice material. In other 
words, one cannot judge nor foster reflection solely using the TA/content component. Teaching 
and assessing reflection cannot be teaching and assessing a set content. Rather, it is rather the 
difference, the amount of processing and change between the starting content (TAstarting) and the 
outcome-content (TAprocessed) of reflection that is its better proxy measure. Highly mature 
reflection that involves all five components in deep interaction will evidently foster more 
extensive advancement between the starting content and the outcome-content. Another 
metaphor to help distinguish the between the assessment of the outcome and the process of 
reflection is that of the odometer and the tachymeter. The odometer measures the distanced 
travelled, i.e., the content that has been acquired; an expert might have travelled a lot, a novice 
much less. But the tachymeter measures the speed, the distance being travelled, i.e., the process 
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that supports the acquisition of content; a novice might well drive much faster than an expert, 
despite still being far from him in total mileage. Starting with the same level of content and 
expertise and, ceteris paribus, greater reflection will travel farther and translate into greater 
expertise.  
Trigger and frequency of reflection 
Because our proposed model is discriminative of what reflection requires, it facilitates the reliable 
identification of occurrences of reflection and of what triggers them. The current assessment and 
teaching of reflection is principally interested in reflection-on-action (i.e., reflection after the 
action), and more exactly with what could be labelled “reflection-on-demand” (i.e., reflection 
after the action and when asked for reflection), for example, in reflective writing.95 There are 
presumably many significant differences between reflection-on-demand and authentic in vivo 
reflection in- and on-action. Yet, what is important in reflection is not only to better reflect-on-
demand, but also to better reflect tout court. Consequently, the future teaching and assessment 
of reflection should include provision for its triggers and frequency of occurrence. Because a 
propensity to trigger and undergo reflection frequently might reasonably be more indicative of 
the impacts of reflection on practice than is the ability to reflect on demand, the factors that 
influence both triggering and occurrence of reflection should be further studied. 
Fidelity 
Because our model of reflection distinguishes between the five core components and other 
elements external to reflection, it allows for the analysis of what can be labelled the fidelity of 
reflection. By clearly identifying what is involved in reflection, it becomes possible to examine if 
its content adequately mirrors the experience reflection stems from. As the TA component of 
reflection emerges from the reality of experience, the process of its inclusion into reflection can 
be error and bias prone. The ACEI component calls for close appreciation of our TA; in doing so, 
one should examine whether the starting TA content is a faithful representation of the true 
triggering event that led to reflection, and scrutinize it for inadequacies that might mar reflection 
from the outset. Figure 10 shows how the concept of fidelity of reflection fits in its broader 
context, between the triggering content and TAS. 
Further avenues of research 
As was mentioned previously in the Methodological considerations section, the ultimate test of 
validity and usefulness of our model of reflection is its ability to inform practice. The fundamental 
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goal of the construct of reflection is to foster better thinking and actions, and in medicine better 
practitioners and clinicians. To study if our model can eventually assist in this endeavor, we here 
present a few further avenues of research for its theoretical validation and its concrete 
application. 
Testing our conceptualization: an assessment instrument for reflection 
One logical next step after producing a model for a construct is to use it as a blueprint to devise 
an assessment instrument. Once reflection can be reliably measured, it will be possible to 
characterize its correlation with other constructs in medical education (e.g., expertise, 
professionalism, clinical reasoning, etc.). This correlation would provide empirical arguments for 
the validity of reflection and our conceptualization of it. 
There are many options in the medical education literature for creating an assessment 
instrument: (i) scales, (ii) thematic coding, (iii) qualitative analysis, and (iv) analytical instructional 
rubrics.96 Each has its benefits and disadvantages; the most significant disadvantage of the last 
three options is that they can only assess reflective writing or productions, which probably differs 
from reflection in vivo as has been discussed. Therefore, devising a new scale using our 
conceptualization of reflection might be the most attractive further avenue of research. Using our 
five-component view of reflection, a multidimensional questionnaire could be constructed with 
subscales for each component and for the interactions between them. 
Using our conceptualization to foster reflection 
Instead of measuring reflection, one avenue of research could proceed directly to the application 
of our conceptualization to foster it. Without necessarily testing our model, one could still develop 
reflective applications based on it (e.g., reflective questioning, reflective mentoring, or reflective 
writing). Because our model is structure-driven and discriminative, we hypothesize that it will 
greatly improve the transfer of the complex theoretical concept of reflection into practice. For 
example, in reflective writing, broad instructions about the five core components that reflection 
entails could be provided to learners beforehand; in reflective questioning and mentoring, 
training could be arranged for educators with regards to how best to trigger and cultivate 
reflection. 
Our theoretical model of reflection can also be used to examine how the extrinsic elements (e.g., 
timing, environment, discipline, or emotions) might influence reflection, each of its core 
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components, and their fostering. Obviously, examining the influence of extrinsic elements on 
reflection will be facilitated if reflection itself can be assessed independently and reliably (which 
brings us to the usefulness of an assessment scale for reflection). There is thus a delicate balance 
to be struck between the uninformed practical usage of a theoretical model and an interest in the 
sole validation of a model, especially when its true usefulness lies in practice. The abstract and 
the concrete are indissociable, as Dewey noted, and the further study of reflection must explore 
both sides. 
Methodological research 
We wish to mention one last idea for further research which pertains not to reflection but to the 
methodology of our research process. In pedagogy, reflection is not alone among concepts in 
need of clarification with regards to their definition and operationalization. We hypothesize that 
the methodology we used to clarify and better define reflection might serve as a guiding process 






In philosophy and education, reflection has long been a fundamental concept. From its early 
description by the Greek philosophers to the more recent inquiry by educational theorists, most 
notably Dewey and Schön, reflection has remained a hazy, murky, and complex concept. With its 
massive uptake and development by educators and professionals in practice, its enigmatic nature 
has culminated in major difficulties in operationalization and empiric validity. 
Aiming to clarify the nature of reflection, we conducted a research process involving a systematic 
appraisal of the current literature for the most influential definitions of reflection and coined a 
new unifying meta-definition and model. To provide the most pragmatic and useful 
conceptualization of reflection, our process was directed by five criteria: structure-driven 
modeling, systematic representativeness, discriminative ability, context/content-independence, 
and operationalization. 
Reflection comprises five core components (TA, ACEI, CF, VC, S), distinct from its numerous 
extrinsic elements, and is defined as: 
The process of engaging the self in attentive, critical, exploratory, and 
iterative interactions with one’s thoughts and actions, and their underlying 
conceptual frame, with a view to changing them and with a view on the 
change itself. 
We submit that our proposed definition and model provide a new platform to understand, study, 
assess, and teach reflection. In consideration of their multiple advantages—both practical and 
theoretical—over current definitions, we believe that they will open up new avenues of inquiry, 
along better delineated and consensual understanding of reflection. To better understand, to 
better study, and to better foster reflection are imperative if reflection is to fulfill its promise to 
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